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INTRODUCTION
Both the rules of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")' and the
law of the European Union ("EU") 2 safeguard domestic industries
against dumped3 imports, provided that these imports cause (or
threaten to cause) material injury to the complaining industry. The
imposition of antidumping measures, however, has an effect that is
far from isolated. For example, applying antidumping duties on im-
ported commodities increases the costs of production for domestic
1. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter GATT
1994] (permitting the use of antidumping and countervailing duties against coun-
tries exporting products at less than normal value); see also GATT 1994, Annex
IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round [hereinafter WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement] (enumerating that antidumping measures shall only be ap-
plied under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the WTO Antidumping Agreement).
2. See Council Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on Protection Against
Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of the European Union, 1996 O.J.
(L 56) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 384/96 or Basic Regulation] (adopting
common rules for protection against dumped or subsidized products from non-EU
members).
3. See WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note I, art. 2.1 (defining dump-
ing as the introduction of a product into the commerce of a country at an export
price that is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, of the




manufacturers who use these imported commodities to manufacture
finished added-value products. The manufacturers' concerns are to
continue obtaining supplies at the lowest possible cost. Other groups,
such as consumers, importers, and retailers, have similar interests to
protect. Therefore, these broad and competing interests must some-
how be balanced.
The WTO Antidumping Agreement encourages members to make
the imposition of duties voluntary, rather than mandatory, once
dumping and consequent injury are shown to exist." Although the
WTO Antidumping Agreement does not explicitly prescribe a public
interest test, the Conzmunitv's 1994 Basic Antidumping Regulation
has historically maintained the principle that a domestic industry,
showing injury caused by dumping, is not automatically entitled to
relief (i.e., the "Community interest" principle).5 Relief will be de-
nied if it is not considered to be in the Community interest.' This test
has traditionally distinguished European Community antidumping
law from U.S. antidumping law, for the U.S. antidumping adminis-
tering authorities do not have similar discretion under U.S. law to
deny or modify relief to a domestic industry.'
4. See id. art. 9.1 ("it is desirable that the imposition (of duties) is permissive
in all Member states or custom territories.").
5. The WTO rules, however, are not indisputable. Dunng meetings in May
200 with the EU Commission in Brussels, the Japanese government insisted that
antidumping provisions be on the agenda of any future WTO negotiations, and
wanted a mandate calling for a public interest test in antidumping cases. See U.S.,
EU t, to narrow gaps on J1TO talks, Inside US Trade, June 16, 2000, at i5.
6. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2, art. 21(1) (determining inter-
vention in cases of dumping on the basis of whether it serves the Community inter-
est as a whole, taking into consideration the interests of domestic industry, and us-
ers and consumers of the product in question). Measures against dumping vill not
be applied where authorities, having weighed all relevant factors, do not conclude
that it is not in the Community interest to apply such measures. See id.
7. See EDWIN A. VERMULST. ANTIIDUMPING LAW AND PRAcTICE 1\ THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 330-31 (1987) (contrasting the
EU's Community interest analysis with the United States' procedure for imposing
antidumping duties, which only takes into consideration the position of interested
parties to the dispute).
8. But see Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), (7TIC
Seminar: America's Consuning Industries and the new Global Economy (com-
ments of Lewis F. Leibowitz, Counsel to CITAC) (demanding for the addition of a
public interest component to antidumping cases such that antidumping duty cases
2001] 1029
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In theory, the Community interest principle operates as a safety
valve in antidumping cases. It allows the possibility of avoiding the
automatic imposition of duties where duties would create adverse,
even disastrous economic effects on other sectors of industry." In
practice, though, EU Member states have rarely used the Community
interest mechanism as a reason for refraining from antidumping
measures.' ° Instead, the interests of the injured industry of the Com-
munity interest state have generally prevailed over the interests of
other parties-such as importers, upstream and downstream suppli-
ers, retailers, and consumers-and, thus, protection is granted." A
number of Member states, however, have exerted political pressure
to overhaul the manner in which the Community interest test is ap-
plied, and to attribute greater value to commercial and economic in-
terests other than those of the complaining Community industry. 2
would be terminated where relief would be clearly detrimental to the public inter-
est) available at http://www.citac-trade.org.
9. See Report from the Commission, Eighteenth Annual Report from the
Commission to the European Parliament on the Community's Antidumping and
Antisubsidy Activities (1999), COM (00)210 final, at 20 (stating that it must be
established that the application of relief measures will not be contrary to the over-
all interest of the Community, and that the interests of all relevant economic op-
erators must be taken into account during the investigation of the Community in-
terest test).
10. There are only a few notable exceptions where Community interest states
have avoided the automatic imposition of duties in an antidumping proceeding. See
Commission Decision of 10 January 1994 Terminating the Antidumping Proceed-
ing Concerning Imports of Gum Rosin Originating in the People's Republic of
China (PRC), 1994 O.J. (L 41) 50 [hereinafter Gum Rosin from China]; Commis-
sion Decision of 21 December 1998 Terminating the Antidumping Proceeding
Concerning Imports of Certain Laser Optical Reading Systems for Use in Motor
Vehicles Originating in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China
and Taiwan, 1999 O.J. (L 18) 62 [hereinafter Disc Changers from Japan, Korea.
Malaysia, PRC and Taiwan].
I I. See J. Bourgeois, EC Antidumping Enforcement--selected second genera-
tion issues, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 563, 589 (1985), reprinted in IVO VAN BAEL
& J.F. BELLIS, ANTIDUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION LAWS OF THE EEC
150 (1990) ("it can be said that in many cases, once dumping and injury are found
and measures are likely to give relief to the complainant industry, there is a pre-
sumption that such measures would be in the Community interest.").
12. See Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The As-
cendancy ofAntidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. Bus. 49, 83 (1997) (noting
that the consideration of consumer and public interest in the community can serve
as an opportunity for EU states opposed to an antidumping measure to seek reduc-
1030 [16:1027
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Along with new procedural rules introduced in 1994," the Euro-
pean Commission has adopted a more thorough approach to assess-
ing precisely where the Community interest lies in antidumping
cases. Reform of the substantive approach, however, has not taken
shape through new provisions in the EU Regulations. Rather, the re-
form is evident from the methodological approach applied by the
Commission in investigations carried out since the beginning of
1996.' 4 When viewed in conjunction with the procedural modifica-
tions in the EU Antidumping Regulation, it is apparent that there has
been a shift in the Community interest test, away from the traditional
view of the complaining Community industry's interests being para-
mount. 5 Together, these procedural and substantive changes suggest
greater scope for taking into account the interests of other relevant
economic operators.
Based on the foregoing, the question is whether these changes are
sufficient to diffuse the political and economic tensions of the previ-
ous interpretation of the Community interest test. This Article at-
tempts to answer this question. First, it evaluates the shortcomings of
the previous approach towards assessing where the balance of the
Community interest lay in antidumping cases. Second, it considers
the criticisms of this approach. The change in approach brought
about by these reforms can be analyzed against this background. Fi-
nally, this Article assesses whether the appropriate balance of inter-
ests has been struck through the new methodology applied by the
Community institutions and, if not, what reforms should be imple-
mented to achieve a more reasonable balance of interests.
tion (or elimination) of the antidumping duty margins to the level minimally re-
quired to offset the injury).
13. See Council Regulation 522/94 of 7 March 1994 on the Streamlining of
Decision-Making of Commercial Defense, 1994 O.J. (L 66) 10 (facilitating actions
by European Community members against dumping by streamlining the proce-
dural requirements to bring a grievance).
14. See infra Part IV (discussing the Commission's methodological approach
regarding the Community interest test since 1996).
15. See infra Part III (discussing the amendments to the regulations goveming
the Community interest test).
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I. APPLICATION OF THE 'COMMUNITY
INTEREST' CLAUSE BEFORE 1996
The concept of 'Community interest' was created as an umbrella
under which the various competing interests of Community indus-
tries could be evaluated in light of the application of anti-dumping
measures. 6 Unfortunately, the original basic antidumping regulation'
and succeeding regulations,'8 with the possible exception of the two
16. See Fifteenth Report from the Commission to the European Parliament on
the Community's Antidumping and Antisubsidy Activities (1996), COM(97)210
final, at 3 (noting that even though the WTO rules set minimum conditions for ap-
plying antidumping measures, the Community legislation contains two further pro-
visions, which are not applied by all WTO members, that are aimed at ensuring a
balanced application of the Community's antidumping rules: the "Community in-
terest test," which is based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a
whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers;
and the "lesser duty rule").
17. See Council Regulation 459/68 on Protection Against Dumping or Granting
of Bounties or Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the European
Economic Community, 1968 O.J. (L 93) 1.
18. See generallj Council Regulation 2011/73 on Protection Against Dumping
or Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the
European Economic Community, 1973 O.J. (L 206) 3 of 24 July 1973 amending
Regulation (EEC) No. 459/68 on Protection Against Dumping or Granting of
Bounties or Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the European Eco-
nomic Community; Council Regulation 1411/77 of 27 June 1977 Amending
Regulation No. 459/68 on Protection Against Dumping or Granting of Bounties or
Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the European Economic Com-
munity, 1977 O.J. (L 160) 4 (creating a framework for decision making and en-
forcement regarding measures to be taken against dumping by non-EU members);
Council Regulation 1681/79 of 1 August 1979 Protection Against Dumping or
Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the
European Economic Community, 1979 O.J. (L 196) 1 (amending Art. 3 of Council
Regulation 459/68 for purposes of determining the qualifications for a dumped
product); Council Regulation 3017/79 of 20 December 1979 on Protection Against
Dumping or Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by Countries which are not Mem-
bers of the European Economic Community, 1979 O.J. (L 339) 1 (establishing
provisions for protection against dumped and subsidized imports from non-
members of the Community); Council Regulation 1580/82 of 14 June 1982 on
Amending Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79 on Protection Against Dumping or
Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the
European Economic Community, 1982 O.J. (L 178) 9 (amending Council Regula-
tion 3017/79 to establish regulatory review concerning decisions on antidumping
and countervailing duties resulting in defensive undertakings); Council Regulation
2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on Protection Against Dumping or Granting of Bounties
or Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the European Economic
1032 [16:1027
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most recent,'" fail to define the scope of the principle in any mean-
ingful or systematic way!" The prior regulations neither distin-
guished succinctly pertinent interests from wholly or partially irrele-
vant interests of the various interest groups, nor provided guidance as
to a hierarchy of interests or special considerations to be taken into
account in making an antidumping protection assessment.
Instead, the European Court of Justice gives considerable discre-
tion to the Commission to define the extent and scope of the concept
of "Community interest."2' The Commission may consider a wide
range of factors for its decisions. In the past, it indicated that the
most important factors were the interests of the consumers and users
of the imported product, as well as the competitive status of the
Community, 1984 O.J. (L 201) 1 (adopting common rules for protection against
dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the Community);
Council Regulation 1761/87 of 22 June 1987 Amending Regulation (EEC) No.
2176/84 on Protection Against Dumping or Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by
Countries which are not Members of the European Economic Community, 1987
O.J. (L 167) 9 (amending Regulation No. 2176/84 on protection against dumped or
subsidized imports from countries not members of the Community); Council
Regulation 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on Protection Against Dumping or Granting of
Bounties or Subsidies by Countries which are not Members of the European Eco-
nomic Community, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1 (establishing provisions for protection
against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the Commu-
nity).
19. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2. art. 2 10) (declining to inter-
vene in cases of dumping where authorities do not conclude that it is not in the
Community interest to apply such measures): Council Regulation 3283,94 of 22
December 1994 on Protection Against Dumping or Granting of Bounties or Subsi-
dies by Countries which are not Members of the European Economic Community,
1994 O.J. (L 349) 2, art. 22(1) (reiterating Council Regulation 384/96, art. 21()).
20. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note 18. art. 12 (addressing
definitive actions to be taken where antidumping measures ha%,e materially harmed
"Community interests," though not specifying what the term means); Council
Regulation 2423/88, supra note 18, art. 12 ("\\'here the facts finally established
show that there is dumping or subsidization during the period under investigation,
and injury caused thereby, and the interests of the Community call for Community
intervention, the Commission, after consultation, shall impose a definitive anti-
dumping or countervailing duty.").
21. See generally Case 188/85, Fediol v. Commission. 7 E.C.R. 4193 (1988)
(upholding the Commission's refusal to grant relief to a European industry against
another unfair trade practice, subsidization, reasoning that that the Commission
had "very wide discretion" under the Community interest clause of the antidump-
ing and countervailing legislation in force).
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Common Market.2 The Commission, however, never specified the
relative importance or weight of these other factors in relation to the
interests of the domestic industry seeking antidumping relief. In a
significant number of cases, the Commission, when addressing
Community interest, has simply stated that the imposition of anti-
dumping measures is in the Community interest in light of serious
difficulties of the Community industry.2' Almost invariably, the con-
cept of Community interest has been equated with the overriding
need to grant protection to Community industries from dumped
products.
Advocates for the imposition of antidumping duties argue that the
impact of a price increase from antidumping measures on the rele-
vant product would be small, 24 or easily absorbable,"s by consumers
and industrial users. The Commission has argued that it is in the con-
sumers' long-term interest to have a viable Community industry to
22. Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2, at 3.
23. See Council Decision of 9 February 1987 Accepting an Undertaking in
Connection with the Antidumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of Certain
Paints and Brushes Originating in the People's Republic of China, 1987 O.J. (L 46)
45, 48 (concluding that it was appropriate to take action against antidumping due
to the negative effects on the Community interest); see also Council Regulation
1244/86 of 28 April 1986 Imposing a Definitive Antidumping Duty on Imports of
Copper Sulphate Originating in Yugoslavia, 1986 O.J. (L 113) 4, 6 (concluding
that the imposition of antidumping duties were in the best interests of the Commu-
nity to eliminate the harm inflicted upon the industry).
24. See Council Regulation 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Calcium Metal Originating in the People's Re-
public of China and Russia, 1994 O.J. (L 270) 27, 30-31 (deciding to enact a pro-
visional antidumping duty in light of the harm imposed on the Community indus-
try); see also Council Regulation 821/94 of 12 April 1994 Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Silicon Carbide Originating in the People's Re-
public of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 1994 O.J. (L 94) 21,
27-28 (imposing definitive antidumping duties to eliminate the injurious effects of
dumped imports).
25. See Commission Decision 84/259 of 10 May 1984 Accepting an Under-
taking in Connection with the Antidumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of
Certain Sensitized Paper Originating in Japan, 1984 O.J. (L 124) 45, 48 (stating
that consumers would suffer only minor impact due to protective measures that
would not affect purchasing habits); see also Commission Regulation 699/88 of 15
March 1988 Imposing a Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Oxalic Acid
Originating in Taiwan and South Korea, 1988 O.J. (L 72) 12, 14 (taking defensive
action against dumping in order to protect Community industries given the Com-
mission's belief that the exporting industry members would not be harmed).
1034 [16:1027
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compete with and offer alternatives to imports.' Furthermore, the
Commission has argued that there is no guarantee that consumers
and users will continue to benefit from price advantages resulting
from unfair competition.27 Factors that may outweigh the disadvan-
tage of higher prices caused by the imposition of antidumping duties
may be experienced through the benefits of safeguarding employ-
ment, avoiding dependency on imports, and maintaining a competi-
tive technological sector within the Community.' Regulations, which
have introduced antidumping measures, have relied on the basis of
assigning 'special weight' to the elimination of the trade-distorting
effects of injurious dumping-indicating that it is in the Community
interest to impose antidumping measures. : Thus, the importance of
eliminating the effects of injurious dumping has nearly created an ir-
refutable presumption in favor of protecting Community industries
from injurious dumping.
Next to the Community's agenda to eliminate harmful dumping
was the need to restore effective competition." The Commission's
approach to dumping has been based on the assumption that dumping
is an unfair trade practice, which ipsojacto distorts the competitive
26. See Council Regulation 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Electronic Typewriters Originating in Japan,
1985 O.J. (L 163) 1, 9 (arguing that, while defensive measures may raise prices in
the short term, any harm incurred is outweighed by the long-term benefit to con-
sumers of having a viable Community industry that can offer an alternative to im-
ports).
27. See Commission Regulation 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 Imposing a Provi-
sional Antidumping Duty on Imports of VCRs Originating in Japan and the Re-
public of Korea, 1988 O.J. (L 240) 5, 15 (noting that it is unclear whether consum-
ers would continue to benefit from price advantages in the future if defensive
measures were not imposed).
28. See id. (noting that several thousands of jobs could be lost if Community
industries ceased to produce VCRs).
29. See Commission Regulation 1645/95 of 5 July 1995 Imposing a Provisional
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Certain Microwave Ovens Originating in the
People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Malaysia, 1995
O.J. (L 156) 5, 19 ("The purpose of antidumping measures is to eliminate the trade
distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition which
is. as such, in the interest of the Community."): see also Council Regulation
2557/94, supra note 24, at 30 ("Removing distortions of competition arising from
unfair commercial practices is fundamentally in the general Community interest").
30. Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2. at 3.
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conditions within the Community. The imposition of antidumping
duties, therefore, restores the competitive environment.3' The idea of
needing to negate the distortion, however, would almost always jus-
tify the adoption of antidumping measures.32
The failure by the Community to assess properly the competitive
conditions inside a specific market before imposing antidumping du-
ties has been one of the most critical deficiencies in the methodology
applied for determination of the Community interest balance." Ig-
noring an unfair competitive environment and restricting or blocking
foreign competition through the imposition of antidumping duties
signaled the creation of an even worse competitive situation.'
The EU Antidumping procedural rules underlying the Commis-
sion's substantive evaluation of Community interest did not require
that the authorities consider other interests apart from Community
31. See generalv CLIVE STANBROOK & PHILlIP BENTLEY, DUMPING AN)
SUB IDIES 144 (1996).
32. In fact, the Commission has even refused to refrain from adopting meas-
ures on the grounds of Community interest in instances where a Community in-
dustry has been found to have previously engaged in cartel behavior. See Commis-
sion Regulation 823/95 of 10 April 1995 Imposing a Provisional Antidumping
Duty on Imports of Disodium Carbonate Originating in the United States, 1995
O.J. (L 83) 8. In 1990, the Commission imposed fines on three Community soda
ash producers, thus penalizing infringements of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty. See Commission Decision of 19 December 1990 Relating to a Proceeding
under Articles 85, 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1990 O.J. (L 152) 1. The Commission
discovered market share agreements designed to restrict competition, exchange
agreements and anticompetitive discount practices. See id. at 16, 21. In 1995, how-
ever, the Commission decided to impose provisional antidumping duties on im-
ports of soda ash from the United States. See STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note
31, at 52. With respect to the anticompetitive behavior of the Community produc-
ers, the Commission explained that the producers concerned were required to cease
such anticompetitive practices, and that the situation was under surveillance. The
Commission went on to state that "it can therefore be assumed that normal com-
petitive conditions have been reestablished in the Community and that the Com-
munity soda ash industry is now more competitive and market-driven than it was
before in 1991. Consequently, this situation should not be distorted by unfair trad-
ing practices." See id. at 16.
33. Id. at 144.
34. See Patrick A. Messerlin, Antidumping Regulations or Pro-Cartel Law?
The EC Chemical Cases, 13 WORLD ECON. 465 (1990) (noting that an analysis of
extra-EC and intra-EC trade flows reveals that most EC antidumping measures
have been very costly for EC consumers).
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industries. Thus, EU authorities were not obliged to make an analysis
on their own notion of the different Community interests." Rather,
various interest groups were given certain rights to submit their
views to the investigating authorities. When interest groups failed to
submit their views to the Commission, the authorities regularly re-
frained from taking the interests of that particular sector into consid-
eration.16 The rights of various parties to intervene in antidumping
proceedings differed sharply, for consumer and user organizations
were given a limited role in antidumping proceedings, including the
right to submit their views in writing at the start of an investigation.'
They did not, however, have the right to inspect the non-confidential
file of the Commission in a particular case, nor were they entitled to
an oral hearing, nor did they have the right to be informed of the
findings and conclusions of the authorities prior to the adoption of
antidumping measures' Certainly, for the Community interest test to
be effective, it had to allow for potentially negatively affected parties
to defend their interests by giving them not only the opportunity to
present their arguments to the investigators, but also the legal stand-
ing to do so.i
In 1989, the European Office of Consumer Unions (-BEUC") at-
tempted to challenge its lack of access to the record of an antidump-
ing investigation.40 The BEUC relied on, inter alia. the general prin-
ciple that a person is entitled to a fair hearing in proceedings, where
35. Marco Bronckers, Rehabilitating Antidnping and other Trade Remethes
through Cost-Benefit Analyses, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 11 (1996) [hereinafter
Bronkers, Cost-Benefit Analyses].
36. J.H.J. Bourgeois, Trade Measures, Competition PoicY. and the Conunier,
in TRADE LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED ST XTIS N 1\
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 227, 256 (1992).
37. Council Regulation 2423/88, supra note 18. art. 7(1i)a) (outlining the pro-
tocol for a commission proceeding).
38. Id. arts. 7(4)(a), 7(5).
39. See Bernhard Hoekman & Petros Mavrodis, Dumping. .ntithmpng and
Antitrust, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 27, 46 (1996) (arguing that negatively affected par-
ties should have access to the information presented by the import-competing in-
dustry seeking protection in making their case).
40. Case 170/89, Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consammateurs %. Commis-
sion, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5709.
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the outcome of such proceeds may adversely affect his interests .
The European Court of Justice rejected this plea, however, reasoning
that because antidumping procedures were directed at industries pro-
ducing the products rather than the consumers of such products,
these measures could not result in a measure adversely affecting
them.42 In effect, this decision ignored the economic reality that anti-
dumping measures adversely affect consumer interests through
higher prices and a reduced choice of goods.43 The decision is under-
standable, however, in light of the fact that the antidumping legisla-
tion itself is more focused on safeguarding industries being injured
by dumped imports than on consumer interests. Inasmuch as the con-
cern was to remedy unfair trade practices of exporters that were in-
juring a European industry, at this time, the Commission never de-
nied antidumping relief merely out of the concern for the adverse
effects on the consumers or users, which seemingly had any role to
play.4 Consequently, the EC opposed the application of a cost-
benefit analysis to unfair trade remedies in general.
In 1994, only a few years after the BEUC's challenge, the EU, for
the first time, denied antidumping relief in Gum Rosin from China3
on the grounds that European users of the imported product would
suffer overwhelmingly disproportionate adverse effects. Gum rosin is
a primary product used by a number of Community industries, in-
cluding tire manufacturers, the paint industry, adhesive producers,
and varnish producers. 6 Prior to the decision, the Commission re-
ceived a great deal of pressure from a large majority of Member
states to refrain from imposing antidumping measures. The Com-
mission took into consideration the special economic circumstances
41. Id. at 5714.
42. Id. at 5735.
43. See Bronckers, Cost-Benefit Analyses, supra note 35, at II (adding that an-
other, long term, effect would be lower income due to slower economic growth).
44. Marco Bronckers, Antidumping Law and Consumer Interest, in TRADE
LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 261, 265 (1992) [hereinafter Bronckers, Consumer
Interest].
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of the case in its decision. Specifically, while the complaining Com-
munity industry, which was situated in one Member State, only con-
sisted of medium-sized firms, the numerous industrial users of gum
rosin, which were situated throughout most Member States, provided
a large number of jobs.' Therefore, had antidumping measures been
imposed, the Community market would remain largely dependent on
imports as the Community industry's capacity covered only a minor-
ity share.49 The Commission recognized that a price increase for gum
rosin due to antidumping measures could jeopardize the situation of
more important industrial users that required a steady and abundant
supply of gum rosin!0 Consequently, the Commission found that the
negative effects of imposing antidumping duties on user groups
would be "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the benefits accruing
to the Community gum rosin industry." The Gum Rosin case stands
out against the general practice of the Community authorities. To
provide guidance on the applicable Community interest principles,
however, the Commission should have developed further criteria to
assess those circumstances in which it is -overwhelmingly dispro-
portionate" to impose duties because of the effects on consumer or
user groups. Unfortunately, insufficient details on this exceptional
decision are available to assess the merits of arguments such as the
cost increase to the user industry or the relative size of the user in-
dustry workforce. Thus, the Gun Rosin case did not represent a new
willingness to give more attention to the users and consumers, al-
though some valid arguments were used.'2 Instead, it seemed to be
merely a casualty of broader overriding political considerations.
The general practice of equating Community interest to the inter-
est of the complaining Community industry in antidumping cases,
however, inevitably provoked criticism. The result of this practice
was the exclusion or marginalization of important economic interests
48. Id.
49. See Gum Rosin from China, supra note 10, at 54.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 39, at 47 (stating that the new de-
velopments in the Guni Rosin case reveal a tendency to better balance the interests
of beneficiaries and injured parties as a result of an eventual introduction of anti-
dumping duties).
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in the Community's antidumping decision-making process. r' The
Community interest test, as applied, contributed immensely to in-
creasing tensions in the decision-making process, despite the fact that
the purpose of the test was to diffuse pressure within the system.
II. CRISIS IN THE ANTIDUMPING DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS
In contrast with the position in EU competition law, the European
Commission does not have exclusive control over the Community's
antidumping policy. 4 Responsibility for the enforcement of anti-
dumping policy is shared between the Commission and the Council
of Ministers ("the Council"), which is composed of representatives
from the Member States. While the Commission carries out the in-
vestigations and has authority to impose provisional duties, it is the
Member States acting in the Council that have sole responsibility to
impose definitive measures and collect provisional duties.5'
Coordination between the Commission and the Member States is
carried out through the specific inter-institutional Advisory Com-
mittee. The Committee itself is composed of representatives from the
Member States and the European Commission. 6 At various stages in
the investigation, the Commission is required to consult with the
Committee. 7 In theory, if the Member States have been consulted
properly at all important stages of the investigation, the imposition of
definitive measures and the collection of provisional duties is a mere
53. See Bronckers, Cost-Benefit Analyses, supra note 35, at 19 (observing that
EC antidumping authorities still have ample discretion to favor domestic indus-
tries).
54. See Council Regulation 17/62 of February 6, 1962 Implementing Articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1962 O.J. (Special Edition) 87, arts. 3, 9, 15; see also
Luis ORTIz BLANCO, EC COMPETITION PROCEDURE 34 (1998) (remarking that the
Commission is regarded as the guiding hand in matters of community competition
law).
55. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2, art. 9(4) (differentiating be-
tween council and commission powers).
56. Id. art. 15.
57. See id. (outlining the consultation process between the Committee and the
Commission).
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formality.'
Prior to 1994, this process seemed to be working quite effectively.
At the Council Meeting in December 1993, it was agreed upon by
the Member States that future decisions on definitive antidumping
measures would be taken by simple majority vote in the Council, by
a qualified majority as previously required." The change in voting
requirements meant that, in order to impose definitive duties, the
Commission now needs a simple majority of eight out of fifteen
Member States in the Council. Therefore, eight Member States may
also block a Commission proposal to impose definitive duties. This
significantly strengthens the Commission compared with the previ-
ous system of weighted voting under which it needed a qualified
majority in the Council to adopt definitive measures. A minimum of
twenty-five out of eighty-seven votes, which was divided among the
fifteen Member States, "' constituted a blocking minority. Thus, under
the previous voting system, at least three countries could block de-
finitive antidumping duties. The change in voting requirements
should have meant, prima facie, that the Commission's proposals re-
quired less support than before, i.e., a simple majority vote in favor
instead of a qualified majority. Since individual Member States in
the Council have only one vote each, they have become far more
willing than before to withhold their support from the Commission's
proposals for definitive measures on the grounds that it is not in their
national interests to support such measures."' After 1994, a number of
Member States began voting for or against the adoption of measures
based upon the type of interested industries located within their ter-
ritories. 2 Since, in their view, the commercial interests of these eco-
58. See STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 31. at 157 (detailing antidumping
and countervailing procedures administered by the Commission ).
59. Council Regulation 522/94, supra note 13. at 10.
60. See Corr, supra note 12, at 81 (stating that the votes of the Member States
are weighted as follows: Germany. France, the UK. and Italy each have ten votes;
Spain has eight votes; Belgium, Greece. the Netherlands, and Portugal each have
five votes; Austria and Sweden each have four votes; Denmark, Finland. and Ire-
land each have three votes, and Luxembourg has two votes).
61. See id. at 83 (noting that as EU membership expands. the interests of its
constituent Members diverge).
62. See STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 31. at 143 (stating that there is an
obvious polarization in the Advisory Committee when some countries have all the
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nomic operators were not being given proper weight in the Commu-
nity interest assessment during each investigation, it was considered
legitimate to express support for these interests by refraining from
supporting proposals which failed to take them adequately into ac-
count." With the enlargement of the Community, now including fif-
teen countries, the situation appears to have become even more criti-
cal.6'
The political argument then was that, if it is not in the majority of
the Member States' national interests to impose duties, how could it
be in the Community interest to do so?"s While the Commission con-
tinues to define the parameters of the concept through administrative
practice and legal terms, a parallel political notion of Community
interest developed in the Council. This was the notion that the con-
cept of Community interest was in fact an expression of the collec-
tive national interests of the majority of Member States, particularly
manifested in the Advisory Committee and the Council of Minis-
ters.66 This opened the door allowing for other interests of Member
States to be expressed.
Realizing that the administrative procedure did not recognize their
commercial interests adequately, interested parties, particularly in-
dustrial user groups and distributors, turned their attention toward
lobbying Member States to oppose the adoption of measures.67 Obvi-
ously, if eight or more Member States opposed the adoption of
measures, the Council could block any such proposal. By trying to
producers and others only representatives of user indutries).
63. See id. (commenting that the sum of the views of the respective Member
States is not necessarily consistent with the Community interest).
64. See Corr, supra note 12, at 81 (noting that a simple majority imposing de-
finitive antidumping duties can be achieved by representatives of under fourteen
percent of the total Community population).
65. See STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 31, at 143 (arguing that Commu-
nity interest is reflected in the final analysis because it is the sum of the views of
the respective Member States).
66. See id. (disclosing that because the proceedings of the Council are not pub-
lished, Member States can vote without accountability of their own interests).
67. See, e.g., infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Euro-
pean glass industry's efforts to lobby Member States in Council to vote against the
imposition of definitive antidumping duties on U.S. soda ash after the Commission
ignored its pleas in making its Community interest assessment).
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persuade government representatives that antidumping duties would
cause damage to industrial user groups located in their countries,
these groups tried to use extra-procedural means to achieve their
ends.
In Soda Ash from the USA," the Community glass industry, which
uses significant quantities of soda ash in its production process,
strenuously lobbied the individual Member States to prevent the
adoption of definitive antidumping duties." Imposing these duties,
argued the glass industry, would increase their production costs and
render them less internationally competitive." Moreover, the glass
industry argues that the benefits that would accrue to the community
soda ash industry from imposing additional duties could not out-
weigh the damage that would be done to the Community glass manu-
facturing industry.7' While the Commission effectively ignored these
arguments in its Community interest assessment of the matter, seven
Member States sympathized with the case of the Community glass
producers and refused to support definitive antidumping measures. :
A number of user groups implemented similar strategies in a series
of subsequent cases involving various products. In each case, the
user groups pitted their commercial interests against those of the
complaining Community industry. The various Member States
fought these battles in the Council, not as part of the ordinary ad-
ministrative procedures. " The political notion of Community interest
68. Council Regulation 2381/95 of 10 October 1995 Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Disodium Carbonate Originating in the United
States, 1995 O.J. (L 244) 32.
69. Ian Young, Europe Votes .for Duties on L'.S.. CHEMICAXL WK., Oct. 18,
1995, at 12.
70. See Robert Westervelt & Andrew Wood. I-tf" Sells Soda .lsh to Japan as
EU Readies Antidumping Duties, CHEMICAL WK., Feb. 15, 1995, at 13 (reporting
that the European glass industry was arguing that there was no link between U.S.
imports and the problems of the Community soda ash industry).
71. See id. (stating that European soda ash producers. whose prices wvere al-
ready double that of their U.S. competitors. would raise their prices ev en further
without competition from cheaper U.S. imports).
72. See Young, supra note 69, at 13 (noting that the European Council of min-
isters voted eight to seven in favor of imposing definitive antidumping duties on
imports of U.S. soda ash).
73. See Lionel Barber & Jenny Luesby, France Reopens Wfounds on Cotton
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was threatening to usurp the legal one.
The whole issue came to a head in the Unbleached Cotton Fabrics
Case. 4 In January 1996, the Cotton and Allied Textile Industries of
the EC ("Eurocoton"), representing Europe's mainly Mediterranean
cotton growers, complained that China, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Turkey were dumping cotton in the Community mar-
ket.75 The Commission determined that these imports accounted for
more than forty percent of the Community cotton market and that the
aggregate volume of dumped imports had increased by 12.5 percent
in recent years to more than 125,000 tons per year." The Commis-
sion concluded that these imports threatened the future of European
cotton producers. "7 This Commission report in favor of Eurocoton di-
rectly conflicted with the interests of the high value-added textile-
finishing industry based predominantly in Northern Europe, which
claimed it needed the cheap imports to safeguard tens of thousands
of jobs." After conducting an extensive antidumping investigation
into allegations that China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and
Turkey were dumping unbleached cottons in the Community market,
the Commission imposed provisional antidumping duties." The
Commission then proceeded to propose the imposition of definitive
Tariff FIN. TIMES, May 28, 1997, at 4 (discussing the political battle fought by
France and other protectionist EC countries against EC Member States supporting
free trade over whether to impose antidumping duties on cotton imports from
Asia).
74. See Council Regulation 2208/96 of 18 November 1996 Imposing a Provi-
sional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Unbleached Cotton Fabrics Originating in
the PRC, Egypt, India, Indonesia., Pakistan, and Turkey, 1996 O.J. (L 295) 3
[hereinafter Unbleached Cotton Fabrics] (reporting the EC's decision to levy pro-
visional antidumping duties on imports of unbleached cotton fabrics).
75. See id. at 4 (detailing the procedural history of the hereinafter Unbleachled
Cotton Fabrics case).
76. See id. at 13 (assessing injury to European cotton producers in terms of
volume and market share caused by increased imports).
77. See id. at 14-15 (concluding that the increase in cotton imports from 1992
to 1995 had materially injured the European cotton industry).
78. See Jonathan Annells, Britain to Referee Dustup on Cotton, EvENING
STANDARD, Sept. 25, 1997, at 35 (quoting a Commission official who summarized
the dilemma as "two lobbies pitted against each other, both touting massive job
losses and the commission as piggy-in-the-middle.").
79. See Unbleached Cotton Fabrics, supra note 74, at 17-20 (providing details
of the provisional duties imposed by the Commission on cotton imports).
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duties to the Council." ' Nine Member States refused to support the
proposal. 1 Their main argument was that the impact of the additional
duties on the cost of production of manufacturers using this material
in the production of value-added goods was disproportionate to the
benefits to the Community industry seeking protection.)" The impli-
cation was that such measures were not in the interest of the Com-
munity despite the formal affirmative findings of the Commission."
France, which was in the minority, expended a great deal of its po-
litical clout within the EC in an attempt to convince Germany to
change its vote and support the imposition of duties on cotton im-
ports.m In response, Britain, with the support of the Netherlands,
Sweden, Finland, and Ireland, began to call for a further broadening
of the antidumping rules to take greater account of the impact of du-
ties on importing industries."
The principal source of this crisis can be attributed to a single
factor, namely the inflexible policy adopted by the Commission
when assessing whether antidumping measures are in the overall in-
terest of the Community. Since the administrative process did not
take these powerful interest groups into account, they resorted to po-
litical channels to accomplish their goals." The introduction of this
political dimension was the almost inevitable consequence of the
80. See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Unbleached (gray) Cotton Fabrics Originating in
the PRC, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey. CON197160 final (pro-
viding a detailed proposal for definitive antidumping duties on cotton imports).
81. See Barber & Luesby. supra note 73. at 4 (detailing the political battle
fought between EC Member States).
82. See Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen. New Battle Lint', tite .Intithuhnznng
War-Recent Movements on the European Front. 31 J. WORLD TRADL, 135, 154
(June 1997) (explaining that several EC Member states opposed the imposition of
definitive antidumping duties on cotton imports from Asia because higher-priced
cotton would harm their textile finishing industries).
83. Id.
84. See Barber & Luesby, supra note 73, at 4.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the European
glass industry's efforts to lobby Member States to vote against the imposition of
definitive antidumping duties on U.S. soda ash in Council after the Commission
ignored its pleas in making its Community interest assessment).
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strict interpretation applied by the Commission. Thereafter, the
Commission recognized that its original approach to determine
where the interests of the Community lay in such proceedings was
too rigorous. Hence, the European Commission changed its policy to
a more exhaustive approach to balancing competing interests in anti-
dumping cases.8g
III. AMENDMENTS TO THE APPLICATION OF
THE 'COMMUNITY INTEREST' TEST
The Commission first indicated that it would change the way it
applied the Community interest test in the Basic Regulation." The
current Basic Regulation contains the same provision.!" In parallel
terminology, both regulations provide that, before imposing anti-
dumping duties, the Commission will determine whether the Com-
munity interest calls for intervention "based on an appreciation of all
the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the
domestic industry and users and consumers." The Commission
must now draw a distinction between the interests of the Community
industry bringing the antidumping complaint, on the one hand, and
87. See Barber & Luesby, supra note 73, at 4 ("Several EU countries are un-
happy about what they see as French-driven politicization of the antidumping
rules.").
88. See Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 82, at 154-55 (analyzing a Note is-
sued by the Commission following Unbleached Cotton Fabrics suggesting that it
will expand its use of the Community interest test in future antidumping cases),
89. See Council Regulation 3282/94 on Protection Against Dumped Imports
from Countries not Members of the European Community, art. 21(1), 1994 O.J. (L
349) 1, 20 (indicating that the Community interest test required consideration of
community interests as a whole, including the interests of the various domestic in-
dustries, users, and consumers affected).
90. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2, art. 21(1) (providing identical
guidelines to the 1994 regulation regarding the Community interest test).
91. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (indicating that the Commu-
nity used the same provision regarding the Community interest test in 1996 that it
adopted in 1994); see also Explanatory Memorandum: Proposal for a Council
Regulation on Protection Against Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of
the European Community, COM (94)414 final at 166 (explaining that the new
Community interest test provided for in Article 21 of Council Regulation 384/96
provides users and consumers with a comprehensive set of rights under Commu-
nity antidumping law).
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industrial users and consumers on the other. In applying the Com-
munity interest test, the Commission must evaluate these competing
interests and adopt measures only if, on balance, intervention would
be in the Community's interest.
Despite this reformulation, the new regulation gave little indica-
tion of the methodological approach the Commission should use in
application of the revised principle of Community interest. For the
Community authorities to decide not to impose antidumping meas-
ures, they must, in the words of Article 21 of the Basic Regulations,
"clearly conclude that it is not in the Community interest to apply
such measures." 92 Furthermore, Article 21(1) requires the Commu-
nity authorities to give "special consideration" to the need to elimi-
nate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and the need to
restore effective competition." Apart from this, Article 21 provides
no other indication as to how the Community authorities should ap-
proach their task. Both these factors, however, favor the Community
industry. In balancing the competing interests, the Community in-
dustry is still given special weight, and so there is still a presumption
in the language of Article 21(1) in favor of the introduction of anti-
dumping duty measures.? Therefore, the language in Article 21(1)
corresponds closely with the policy adopted by the Commission in
the past, which means that the Community interest will only interfere
with the imposition of duties in the most exceptional of cases." Be-
cause the Basic Regulation lacks detailed substantive guidelines ex-
plaining how the Commission should balance the different compet-
ing interests, the Commission continues to retain considerable
discretion in applying the new Community interest principles on a
case-by-case basis.
While substantive detail is lacking in the revised provisions on
Community interest in the Basic Regulation, the same is not true of
92. See Council Regulation 384/96. supra note 2 (providing the basic statement
of Community interest test).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Klaus Stegemann, Anti-Dunping PolicY antd the (onsumer. 19 J.
WORLD TRADE 466, 474 (1990) (stating that, under the old Community interest
rule, everyone usually expected the Commission to apply the clause ery spanngly
and, generally, only in response to political pressure).
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the provisions concerning procedural rights and safeguards for inter-
ested parties concerning the application of the Community interest
test. In contrast to the earlier regulations, the new Basic Regulation
permits significantly greater access for parties other than the com-
plainants to make representations to Community institutions related
to Community interest.96 Not only complainants, but also importers,
users, consumer groups, and their respective trade associations are
entitled to make their interests in the proceedings known within the
time period specified by the Commission in its notices of initiation."
The same parties may also request a hearing with the Commission to
make their views known on the issue of Community interest," and
they have access to non-confidential information made available by
other parties. 99 The Commission has in fact modified its practice to
conform to this requirement in new investigations. Under current
practice, notices of initiation appearing in the Official Journal of the
European Commission expressly state that user groups and consumer
organizations should make themselves known for the purpose of es-
tablishing Community interest. The Commission also imposes pro-
cedural time-limits on such parties in the same manner as they im-
pose them on traditional interested parties in antidumping
proceedings, i.e., Community industries, exporters, and importers.""
In discharging its obligation to assess Community interest, the
96. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2, art. 21(2) (permitting import-
ers, user groups, and representative consumer organizations to provide information
to the Commission during antidumping proceedings relevant to Community inter-
est).
97. Id.
98. See id. art. 6(5) (allowing all interested parties "likely to be affected by the
result of the proceeding" to request a hearing).
99. See id. art. 6(7) (providing that all interested parties that have made them-
selves known with the access to all non-confidential information).
100. See, e.g., Commission Notice of Initiation of Antidumping Proceedings
Concerning Imports of Personal Fax Machines Originating in the People's Repub-
lic of China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thai-
land, 1997 O.J. (C 32) 3, 4, para. 6 (notifying all interested parties such as import-
ers, representative users, and consumer groups that they may make submissions to
the Commission regarding Community interest).
101. See id. at 4, para. 7 (requiring all interested parties who want to make sub-
missions in regard to Community interest to submit all information in writing
within thirty-seven days).
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Commission dispatches specific Community interest questionnaires
in which the complaining industry, users, and importers are entitled
to explain their specific interest in the proceedings.'" The Commu-
nity interest questionnaire asks interested parties to explain how the
measures will affect their business activities measured in terms such
as additional cost of production, loss of employment, profitability,
reduction of volume in sales, and decreasing market share. Commis-
sion officials subsequently verify this information through on-the-
spot investigations conducted at the premises of the interested parties
making the representations."" The Commission, however, is only
obliged to take into account information gathered on this basis where
it is supported by actual evidence substantiating its validity."', On the
other hand, where no user groups or other interested party responds
to a questionnaire, the Commission is still relatively free to take into
account the factors it wishes when assessing Community interest.
The absence of such responses will invariably mean that the Com-
mission will not deny antidumping duties on the grounds of Com-
munity interest.'05 Where parties make representations concerning
only a small part of the relevant group, the Commission is quick to
find such submissions not persuasive.'"'
102. See, e.g., Council Regulation 449,98 of 23 February 1998 Amending
Regulation 3068/92 in Respect of Definitive Antidumping Duties on Imports of
Potassium Chloride Originating in Belarus. Russia. and Ukraine, 1998 O.J. (L 58)
15, 20 (naming all those to whom the Commission sent questionnaires and who
actually returned them).
103. See id. at 20 (noting that the Commission carried out on-site %enfications
of information provided in several of the returned questionnaires).
104. See Council Regulation 384/96. supra note 2. art. 21(7) ("lnformation shall
only be taken into account where it is supported by actual ev idence which substan-
tiates its validity.").
105. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 593,97 of 25 March 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Unwrought. Unalloyed Zinc Origi-
nating in Poland and Russia, 1997 O.J. (L 89) 6. 14-15 (concluding that since no
user group or other interested party made a submission regarding community inter-
est, absent evidence to the contrary, it was in the Community interest to apply anti-
dumping measures).
106. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1778,97 of 12 September 1997 Imposing
a Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Ferro-Silico-Manganese Onginat-
ing in the People's Republic of China, 1997 O.J. (L 2521 6. 15-16 (determining
that the imposition of antidumping duties would best sen e the Community interest
where the Commission lacked representative information about the user group due
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Users and consumer organizations are now entitled to receive in-
formation provided by other parties involved in the investigation and
to submit their comments on such information to the Commission.""
The Community interest clause also permits these parties to com-
ment on any provisional duties applied by the Commission. '
Through these procedures, Community institutions can conduct a
more structured analysis of Community interest in antidumping pro-
ceedings. Even though the new Basic Regulation has opened the
channels of communication, another matter remains as to how Com-
munity institutions should analyze and take into account this infor-
mation when assessing Community interest.
IV. CHANGES TN THE APPROACH TOWARDS THE
ASSESSMENT OF 'COMMUNITY INTEREST'
After affirmative findings of dumping, injury, and causation, the
Commission now conducts a separate in-depth study of Community
interest in each investigation.' °9 Its purpose is to decide whether the
negative effects that imposing antidumping duties would have on the
Community as a whole outweigh the positive effects such duties
would have on a particular ailing Community industry. The Commis-
sion conducts this evaluation in two stages: (1) an evaluation of the
positive and negative effects of imposing antidumping duties in rela-
tion to the complaining industry itself; and (2) an evaluation of the
positive effects on the Community industry of granting protection
against the negative effects on other industries and interested parties
adversely affected."0
to few users returning questionnaires).
107. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2, art. 21(7) (permitting all par-
ties that have made submissions under the Community interest clause to have ac-
cess to the "key facts and considerations" the Commission is likely to consider in
making its determination).
108. See id. art. 21(4) (permitting all interested parties qualified under the
Community interest clause to comment on provisional duties).
109. See supra notes 89-108 and accompanying text (discussing how the Com-
mission applies the amended Community interest test).
110. See Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 82, at 154-56 (listing the several fac-
tors considered by the Commission in making a Community interest assessment:
competitiveness of the Community industry, effects of antidumping duties on im-
porters, upstream suppliers, and downstream users, and the impact on consumers).
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In applying the Community interest test, the Commission ordinar-
ily presumes that, when it finds dumping, injury, and causality, anti-
dumping measures are in the Community interest.' If the imposition
of antidumping measures would injure the complaining Community
industry, another Community industry, or another party in the Com-
munity substantially more than such measures would benefit the
complaining industry, then the imposition of measures is deemed not
to be in the best interest of the Community."2 This is because the
harmful effect of such measures would be clearly disproportionate to
the main principle being pursued, namely protecting the Community
industry."
3
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MARKET FOR THE RELEVANT
PRODUCT AND ANALYSES OF ITS COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE
The first step in applying the revised Community interest test is to
ascertain the relevant market, including both the type of product con-
cerned and the principal characteristics of the market for the prod-
uct.114 The characteristics of the relevant market are identified by ref-
erence to the nature of the product, supply and demand in the market,
and the geographical concentration of producers and manufactur-
ers."5 The economic viability of the relevant industry is also assessed
at this point, both in terms of domestic sales and volume of ex-
ports."6 Once the significant factors of the relevant market are identi-
111. See id. at 154 (noting the Commission's emphasis on the presumption that
antidumping duties are in the Community interest).
112. See id. at 154-55 (emphasizing that the Community interest test will rarely
be important in antidumping cases since the parties claiming to be harmed by the
imposition of duties must show that harm is "disproportionate" to the benefit that
the complaining industry would incur).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 139-41 (examining the amended Article 2(00)(k) of EC anti-
dumping legislation, under which complainants may point to any factors, which
affect price differentials between domestic EU producers and importers).
115. See Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 82, at 155 (citing factors to be taken
into account during a Community interest assessment, which include an assess-
ment of the market for the product concerned, the record of competitiveness in the
particular industry, the effects of antidumping duties on importers, and the effect of
such measures on Community suppliers and on consumers).
116. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 967/00 of 8 May 2000 Imposing a Provi-
sional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Hairbrushes Originating in the People's
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fled, the Commission performs an evaluation of its competitive envi-
ronment in terms of competition among domestic producers as well
as that between domestic producers and foreign exporters. ,
7
1. Competition Among Domestic Producers
The existence of anti-competitive practices or structures within the
Community market is a relevant factor in determining whether it
would be in the interests of the Community to impose protective an-
tidumping measures. Article 21 (1) of the Basic Regulation explicitly
states that the need to restore effective competition shall be given
special consideration in an antidumping investigation."" The diffi-
culty is that in some cases the objectives of antidumping policy and
of competition policy conflict."' To balance the requirements of an-
tidumping and internal competition policy, the Community authori-
ties are now required to take the entire economic market into consid-
eration and to refrain from applying antidumping measures that
would distort competition within the Community. Thus, where the
Community producers might use the antidumping proceedings to
drive independent importers from the market,'20 or where the effect of
duties would create or reinforce a dominant position within the
common market, it may not be in the Community interest to impose
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, 2000 O.J. (L
111) 4 (analyzing and attempting to alleviate the adverse market effects of dump-
ing in Asian markets on the Community).
117. See id. (comparing the profit margins of Asian importers with those of
thirteen major EU producers of hairbrushes and finding measurable economic in-
jury).
118. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2, art. 21(1); see also TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 3(g), O.J. (C 340)
3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY] (requiring Community authorities to support a
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted).
119. See Case 16/90, Detlef Nolle v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 1-5177 (1988)
(Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven) (construing the antidumping provi-
sions of the EC Treaty as intended to protect domestic European industries from
price undercutting by foreign exporters).
120. See Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 82, at 155 (stating that the Commis-
sion's determination on the degree of competition has become more relevant and
seems to acknowledge that it is quite possible that EC companies attempt to abuse
the antidumping instrument in order to decrease the level of competition on the EC
market).
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121measures.
First, the Commission makes a record on the state of competitive-
ness in the industry'2 by examining the structure and characteristics
of the Community industry. Generally, the characteristic of an in-
dustry with a large number of independent producers indicates that
the degree of competition will be relatively high. ' ,' On the other
hand, a Community industry characterized by a monopoly. a du-
opoly, or some other less competitive structure, is an indication of
weak competition.'24 Where the market is composed of a large num-
ber of independent Community producers and competition is intense,
imposing duties will more likely be in the Community interest. ' For
example, where industrial user groups enioy the presence of a wide
range of suppliers in the Community industry, the imposition of anti-
dumping measures is more likely to be in the Community interest as
the impact will be far less noticeable due to the alternative sources of
supply. 2 6 Similarly, if the complaining Community industry cannot
121. See Commission Decision of 15 December 1990 Relating to a Competition
Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 1991 O.J. (L 152) 1 (outlining the
Commission's recognition of the influence of antidumping duties as a factor in
market dominance).
122. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 209i97 of 3 February 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Certain Handbags Originating in the
People's Republic of China, 1997 O.J. (L 33) 11 (assessing the economic impact of
Chinese leather imports on the competitiveness of the market tbr European leather
handbags).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 137 96 of 22 January 1996 Imposing a
Definitive Antidumping Duty on Imports of Refractory Chamottes Originating in
the People's Republic of China, 1996 O.J. (L 21) 1 (reJecting the contention that
antidumping measures could create a European monopoly in the chamotte market).
125. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2140/97 of 30 October 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Personal Fax Machines Originating
in the People's Republic of China, Japan. Republic of Korea. Malaysia. Smaga-
pore, Taiwan, and Thailand, 1997 O.J. (L 297) 61 (asserting that antidumping
measures would not have a significant effect on the market for fax machines be-
cause of the number of competitors in the market).
126. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2496/97 of II December 1997 Imposing a
Definitive Antidumping Duty on Imports of Silicon Metal Originating in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 1997 O.J. (L 345) 1 (stating that as far as the competitive
environment in the Community market is concerned, user industries and other eco-
nomic operators have always enjoyed the presence of a wide range of competitors
in the product market). The alternative sources of silicon from Norway, Brazil,
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supply all the requirements of its industrial consumers, it is also
likely that it will be in the Community interest to impose antidump-
ing measures as imports will be needed to supply Community users.
The imposition of antidumping duties will cause the price of both
domestic and imported products to rise in response to an increase in
demand. 1
2 7
Where the Community industry is composed of a small number of
producers, the Commission is more cautious in evaluating this char-
acteristic. For example, in Ringbinder Mechanism,' despite the fact
that a virtual duopoly existed, the Commission imposed antidumping
measures believing that it would be corrective and that it would not
prevent the entrance of exporters from other countries into the Com-
munity market.'29
Where there are a relatively large number of producers, it will be
highly relevant whether such producers have engaged in practices
that could be described as anti-competitive under Article 85(1) of the
EC Treaty.'" An established history of abusive anti-competitive col-
South Africa, and Australia may have mitigated the adverse economic effects of
Chinese price undercutting. See id.
127. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 45/97 of 15 January 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Polyethylene Bags originating in In-
dia, Indonesia and Thailand, 1997 O.J. (L 12) 16 (stating that, since the Commu-
nity producers could only satisfy roughly forty percent of the demand on the
Community market, imports from third countries will therefore always be neces-
sary; and, after the imposition of antidumping measures, producers located in the
countries concerned would therefore be able to promote their exports to the Com-
munity at fair prices, and could even increase their exports attracted by remunera-
tive price levels).
128. See Commission Regulation 1465/96 of 25 July 1996 Imposing a Provi-
sional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Certain Ring Binder Mechanism Origi-
nating in Malaysia and the People's Republic of China, 1996 O.J. (L 187) 47
(finding that the two complaining Community producers of metal ring binders ac-
counted for more than ninety percent of the total EU market share in that industry).
129. See id. (stating that some EU members argued that the imposition of meas-
ures would lead to a duopoly of supply to the Community market, with possible
adverse effects on price). The Commission, however, did not accept this line of
reasoning as it ignored the corrective nature of antidumping measures. See id. The
measures would neither prevent third country exporters from entering the Commu-
nity market, reduce effective competition, nor decrease the quality and diversity of
supply. See id.
130. See Commission Regulation 45/97 of 10 January 1997 Imposing a Provi-
sional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Sacks and Bags made of Polyethylene or
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lusion should be a serious factor weighing against the adoption of
antidumping measures."' The Commission dismisses unsubstantiated
allegations that the Community industry may form a cartel in the fu-
ture as a result of antidumping measures."2 Since its change of pol-
icy, the Commission still has not hesitated before granting protection
to a producer that has abused its dominant position. This issue has
arisen several times already and in none of these cases did the rejec-
tion of measures seem seriously contemplated."' In the most signifi-
cant case, Advertising Matches fiom Japan,"" a formal complaint
was lodged with the Commission's Directorate-General for Compe-
tition Policy against the main producer in the complaining Commu-
nity industry."' The company was alleged to be abusing its dominant
position in the Community market through anti-competitive practices
such as predatory pricing and the acquisition of competitors."' The
Directorate-General for Competition rejected the complaint, a fact
the antidumping case-handlers for the Directorate-General for Trade
Policy seized upon as being a sufficient pretext for rejecting these
Polypropylene Originating in India, Indonesia. and Thailand, 1997 O.J. (L 12) 8
(finding that Indian, Indonesian, and Thai imports, which were in direct competi-
tion with EU manufacturers, rose to a volume of more than fifty-eight percent from
1992 to 1996).
131. Id.
132. See id. (stating that exporters claimed that there was a risk of the complain-
ant industry forming a cartel and that antidumping measures would therefore re-
duce effective competition). The Commission, however, discounted this argument
because there was no indication of any violations of national or Community com-
petition rules. See id.
133. See id. (stating that, as far as the allegations about the abuse of a dominant
position were concerned, the Commission only concluded that, in light of the com-
petitive forces in the Community market, such allegations were without founda-
tion); see also Commission Regulation 1731/97 of 4 September 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Glyphosate Originating in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 1997 O.J. (L 243) 7.
134. See Council Regulation 2025/97 of 15 October 1997 Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports into the Community of Advertising Matches Origi-
nating in Japan, 1997 O.J. (L 284) 57 (finding material injury to complainants who
represent seventy-eight percent of the Community output of the product).
135. Id.
136. See id. (comparing EU production volumes with Japanese import volumes
sold at lower prices in assessing the advisability of imposing import measures).
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allegations. 1 7 This was not, however, a convincing or exhaustive
evaluation of the competitive situation within the Community mar-
ket.'38 Despite the fact that the evidential support for the complaint
was not sufficient for the competition, the Directorate-General
should not necessarily have allowed the antidumping division to ig-
nore the economic implications of the behavior when it authorized
protection in the form of antidumping measures. 9 Furthermore, as
far as can be ascertained from the text of the regulation, no real in-
vestigation into these allegations was made by the Commission.
By not correctly analyzing these allegations of anticompetitive
practices, the Commission is repeating its earlier error of ignoring
the legitimate concerns of user industries when assessing Community
interest.140 It is still unacceptable that Community industries engaging
in anticompetitive behavior should be able to consolidate their posi-
tion by further restricting competition from foreign sources. How-
ever, the argument that the imposition of antidumping duties will re-
duce competition is frequently reversed by the Commission who
maintains essentially that, provided there is a higher price, there will
be more competition.
4'
137. See id. (stating that as to the competition law investigations, the Commis-
sion was aware that a complaint had been lodged with the Community authorities
alleging that the complainant Swedish Match abused its dominant position by
practicing a policy of acquisitions and predatory pricing). The complaint was dis-
missed, however, as there was no supporting evidence. See id.
138. See id. (rejecting Japan's contention that the injury to EU domestic produc-
ers was not material). The Commission found that the adversely affected firms rep-
resented a substantial percentage of EU producers and revenue for the industry,
and that Japanese imports significantly depressed Community industry prices. See
id.
139. Council Regulation 2025/97, supra note 134.
140. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 138/96 of 22 January 1996 Amending
Regulation 520/94 Establishing a Community Procedure for Administering Quan-
titative Quotas, 1996 O.J. (L 21) 6.
141. See id. (arguing that the belief that the imposition of antidumping measures
might lead to a monopolistic position of the Community industry is unfounded,
and that these measures will have the effect of maintaining the number of compet-
ing suppliers of chamottes on the Community market because the measures will
ensure the continued presence of the Community producers together with exporters
from other countries).
1056 [ 16:1027
THE COMMUNITY INTEREST TEST
2. Competition Between Domnestic Producers and Foreign
Exporters
Competition between Community producers and importers is con-
sidered significant if the entire productive capacity of Community
producers cannot satisfy the Community market's needs.": This is
because imports from third countries will always be necessary, espe-
cially if the market share held by the Community industry is low."'
In these circumstances, the likelihood that antidumping measures
will be in the Community interest is normally high.'" If, on the other
hand, the imposition of duties will allow Community producers to
monopolize the Community market by shutting out foreign export-
ers, this must be considered a factor mitigating against the adoption
of antidumping measures."5 This would be particularly so if, for ex-
ample, exports originated from only one country other than the
European Community and there is a single non-EC producer.
There is little evidence showing that the Commission would con-
sider future market foreclosure to foreign exporters due to anti-
dumping duties a valid reason for refraining from imposing duties.
The Commission has rejected claims that high market shares held by
Community producers, and the likelihood of increasing these shares,
are against the Community interest."' Furthermore, the Commission
142. See, e.g., Council Regulation 423/97 of 3 March 1997 Amending Regula-
tion 3433/91 in Respect of Imports Originating in Thailand and Imposing Defini-
tive Antidumping Duties on Imports of Gas-Fuelled, Non-Refillable Pocket Flint
Lighters Originating in Thailand, the Philippines and Mexico. 1997 O.J. (L 65) 1.
143. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1023,97 of 6 June 1997 Imposing a Pro-
visional Antidumping Duty on Certain Imports of Flat Pallets of Wood Originating
in Poland, 1997 (L 150) 4 (determining that, as a result of an eighty-eight percent
increase in Polish imports, the Community industry suffered a loss of twelve per-
cent market share).
144. See id. (conceding that, although the Community industry had a healthy re-
cord in global markets during the investigation period, its market position deterio-
rated to the detriment of medium and small producers such that antidumping
measures were appropriate).
145. See id. (rejecting the argument that the imposition of antidumping measures
could have an anti-competitive effect on EU domestic markets because of the di-
versity of the product market, which includes a number of medium and small
firms).
146. See Commission Regulation 1587,97 of 16 June 1997 Imposing a Pros'i-
sional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Advertising Matches originating from Ja-
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has cited the need to increase low market shares held by Community
producers as being strongly in the Community interest. 1
7
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF MEASURES ON THE
COMMUNITY INDUSTRY
Once the relevant market has been isolated, and its competitive
environment evaluated, the Commission moves on to assess the ef-
fect on the complaining Community industry of imposing anti-
dumping duties against the impact of not imposing duties. 14 It is
critical to note that this analysis is confined to the economic and
commercial impact on the relevant complaining Community indus-
try. No attempt is made at this point to offset competing interests
among other affected industries or interested parties. Furthermore, it
is always considered in the general interests of the Community to
maintain a viable Community industry.
49
The viewpoint of this analysis ignores the past condition of the in-
dustry and focuses on present and future market conditions. This is
inevitable because assessing whether measures are in the interests of
pan, 1997 O.J. (L 158) 8 (recognizing that the Community industry, which repre-
sented seventy-eight percent of the whole Community production and whose mar-
ket share is over fifty percent of the Community's market overall, held an impor-
tant position on the Community market but concluding that antidumping duties
would not result in an abuse of such a position, despite arguments from importers
that the imposition of antidumping duties would strengthen the position of the
complaining industry and put them in a position to set prices in the Community
market at such low levels that the importers would simply be eliminated from it).
147. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1731/97, supra note 133 (stating that
following the imposition of measures, the price of the relevant product and, to
some extent, the volume of sales in the Community market, were expected to rise,
thus enabling the Community industry to recover lost market share and even in-
crease their market share from the expected increase in consumption).
148. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1043/00 of 18 May 2000 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Glycine Originating in the People's
Republic of China, 2000 O.J. (L 118) 6 (assessing the impact on various Commu-
nity industries, including the complainant producers, pet food, agrochemical, and
pharmaceutical industries of Chinese product dumping, and imposing antidumping
measures upon the determination of material injury).
149. See, e.g., Council Regulation 384196 of 22 December 1995 on Protection
Against Dumped Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Commu-
nity, 2000 O.J. (L 56) 1, art. 3 (stipulating that the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding a product importation should be considered in applying the enumerated
factors and in ascertaining the effect of imports on a particular market).
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the Community inherently involves taking a prospective view, i.e.,
evaluating the effect on the industry in the future after duties have or
have not been imposed. To make an accurate assessment, the Com-
munity can only extrapolate from the indicators that have been iden-
tified as part of the investigation into the injury aspects of each
ISO
case.
1. Effect of Measures on MaIarket Share ofthe Community Indhstn
Evidence of declining market shares held by Community indus-
tries is a factor strongly supporting the introduction of measures."' In
the event that the Commission finds that the prospect of duties will
stimulate demand for Community-produced products over non-
Community goods, the possibility of measures increases. In prac-
tice, the Commission tends to identify declining market share with
other factors related to decreasing market share, such as declining
investment and employment.' By aggregating the loss of market
share with other economic indicators evidencing injury, the need for
duties appears even more acute and the imposition of duties therefore
more justifiable.
2. Effect of Measures on Prices and Profit Margins
Price depression, together with evidence of negative profitability
in the Community industry, strongly support intervention being in
the interests of the Community.4 To a certain extent, however, a
150. See id. (listing as relevant to the advisability of imposing antidumping
measures such factors as the rate of increase of dumped imports into the Commu-
nity market, the availability of other export markets, the effect of import prices on
the market price of the Community goods, and the inventories of the product in-
vestigated).
151. See Commission Regulation 1731/97, supra note 133 (finding that the mar-
ket shares of European producers decreased by seven percent as a result of price
cutting practices).
152. See id. (stating that the Commission assumes an increase in demand fol-
lowing the imposition of antidumping measures).
153. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 967/00. supra note 116, at 4 (stating that
it can be expected that the Community industry will increase its market share as a
consequence of the imposition of antidumping measures).
154. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1465/96, supra note 128, at 56 (stating
that, without the imposition of antidumping measures, the financial situation of the
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finding of dumping will always automatically lead to financial losses
for a Community industry since injury caused by dumping is often
attributed to price undercutting or underselling.'" Price depression is
simply the natural corollary of this phenomenon.'56
3. Effect of Measures on Future Production and Capacities
Clearly, where the future existence or viability of the Community
industry is genuinely threatened, there is a strong presumption in fa-
vor of intervention. 157 This presumption is based not only on the need
to ensure the continued existence of the Community industry, but
also, on a macro-economic level, to ensure that competitive condi-
tions inside the Community do not deteriorate because of declining
businesses.""8
Although this is a valid consideration to take into account, the
Commission has, however, seemed too willing to accept these worst-
case scenarios at face value and demanded little evidence of these
allegations. 59 It seems that the fear of job losses and factory closures
Community industry would worsen).
155. See id. (conceding that the imposition of antidumping measures is likely to
improve a Community producer's market share initially, but may eventually lead
to further depressed market prices).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 165/97 of 28 January 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Certain Footwear with Textile Up-
pers Originating in the People's Republic of China and Indonesia, 1997 O.J. (L 29)
3 (arguing that, without measures to correct the effect of the dumped imports, the
Commission considers that the position of the Community producers will further
deteriorate and the existence of the Community industry as a whole will ultimately
be at risk).
158. See id. (stating that, in the Commission's view, if fewer producers are pres-
ent in the Community market, competition may be reduced commensurately).
159. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 837/00 of 19 April 2000 Imposing a Pro-
visional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Certain Cathode-ray Color Television
Picture Tubes Originating in India, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, and
the Republic of Korea, 2000 O.J. (L 102) 15 (arguing that, on the one hand, in the
absence of the imposition of antidumping measures, a further deterioriation of the
situation of the Community industry is quite probable; and that, on the other hand,
because no sufficient evidence was provided by the users of the dumped product
with regard to disadvantages to their businesses, the Commission performed no
subsequent analysis).
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in the manufacturing industry is superseding every other concern.""
Moreover, there is virtually an automatic assumption that this effect
will occur if antidumping duties are not imposed. " ' Frequently, the
evidence for reaching this conclusion is far from conclusive. " In
contrast, little attention has been paid to arguments that, even at full
capacity, the Community industry cannot satisfy the demand in the
Community market and, therefore, measures would not necessarily
be in the overall interest of the Community, especially in times of
short supply. For example, in PVC Bags.fiom India, Indonesia and
Thailand,6' the Commission rejected an argument that imposing
measures would not be in the Community interest because the total
productive capacity of the Community industry could only satisfy
forty percent of the Community demand. '
4. hnpact of Measures on Employment
The issue of employment is raised in almost every case. The pros-
pect of declining employment rates, particularly against a back-
ground of faltering industries, is a strong factor in favor of interven-
tion. This is particularly true where the Community industry is labor-
intensive, or where there has been a great deal of investment in job
creation.65 Additionally, intervention becomes even more compelling
when the majority of the industry's establishments are located in
160. See id. (determining that the declining productivity of the Community mar-
ket is likely to lead to an appreciable loss of manufacturing and employment in this
sector).
161. See id. (stating that "the imposition of antidumping measures is necessary
to prevent further [economic] injury ... and to preserve employment").
162. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1043,00. supra note 148, at 14 (arguing
that, if antidumping measures are not imposed, the sole Community producer will
most likely have to close its production facility because of its low profit margins
and financial losses).
163. See Commission Regulation 45/97, supra note 130, at 18 (finding the ef-
fects of a general recession on the market for plastics to be a negligible factor in
determining whether to impose an antidumping duty).
164. See id. at 18 (ascertaining the effect on the potential uses of bags in the
Community market within the agricultural and chemical sectors as significant fac-
tors mitigating in favor of the imposition of antidumping measures).
165. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 209,97. supra note 122, at 19 (stating
that the Community handbag industry is a significant contributor to employment in
the EC).
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economically disadvantaged areas.166
5. Evaluation of the Impact of Measures on the Complaining
Community Industry
In most cases, the Commission makes a provisional determination
concerning the likely effects of imposing or not imposing measures
on the complaining industry. There are, however, very few situations
where the adverse effects of imposing measures outweigh the bene-
fits to the complaining Community industry. This trend is reflected
in the Community interest analysis of all antidumping investigations
conducted since the change in methodology. The only exception is
found in Leather and Non-Leather Handbags from the PRC,"'7 where
the Commission decided that imposing duties on synthetic handbags
would not benefit the Community industry.1"8 The reasons for the ex-
ception were due to the fact that the product could be easily attained
from third countries, and that employment in the particular Commu-
nity sector was already relatively limited. 69 Several months later,
however, in Textile Footwear from the PRC,'70 importers and retailers
of the dumped product contested the issue again. They argued that,
like in Leather and Non-Leather Handbags from the PRC, anti-
dumping measures would have no positive effect on the Community
industry as the supply of the product would simply be substituted by
third countries. 7 ' Nevertheless, the Council rejected this argument
166. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 593/97, supra note 105, at 14, 15 (ex-
plaining that the fact that the production facilities of two Community producers
most threatened by dumped imports are already located in vulnerable areas threat-
ens to disproportionately impact the local-area economies).
167. See Commission Regulation 1567/97 of I August 1997 Imposing a Defini-
tive Antidumping Duty on Imports of Leather Handbags Originating in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 1997 O.J. (L 208) 31, 41 (describing how the imposition
of definitive antidumping margins would impact importers and traders).
168. Id.
169. See id. (stressing that definitive antidumping measures on handbag imports
are not in the Community's best interest given the likelihood that such handbags
would be imported from third countries).
170. Council Regulation 2155/97 of 29 October 1997, Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Textile Footwear Originating in the People's Re-
public of China, 1997 O.J. (L 298) 1.
171. See id. at 14 (comparing the situation of the textile footwear industry to the
synthetic handbag manufacturers).
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since the complainant Community industry's market share was rela-
tively high and a great amount of investment had already been put
into producing footwear."-
Once injury has been established, determinations rarely result in
the termination of an investigation due to the fact that measures
would not be in the Community interest. Community institutions are
obliged to consider the need to eliminate the trade-distorting effects
of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition. Both of
these factors weigh heavily in favor of intervention. The case for im-
posing measures becomes even stronger where the adverse economic
situation of an industry is compounded by affirmative injury. In the
vast majority of cases where injury has been established, the effects
of imposing measures are positive for the Community industry, i.e.,
increased market share, prices, and profits for the Community indus-
try.' 74 Thus, the imposition of duties often becomes equated with re-
turning the industry to the economic state prior to dumping.
C. BALANCING THE EFFECTS OF MEASURES AGAINST THE
INTERESTS OF OTHER ECONOMIC OPERATORS
While there are very few scenarios where the Community institu-
tions would opt against imposing antidumping measures, oftentimes
the effect of these measures may cause greater damage on other eco-
nomic actors. The damage may even outweigh the benefits to the
complaining Community industry. The Community interest test, if
properly applied, is designed to prevent this type of situation. The
failure to balance these competing interests has led to the crisis in the
172. See id. (rejecting the alleged parallel between the Tettile Footiwear case
and the Synthetic Handbags case, based on the significant market share still held
by the complainant Community industry, the nature of the capital holders, and the
significant industrial investment made to produce footwear).
173. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2. art. 21(1) (requirng that the
Commission, in its evaluation of all of the effected interests, give special consid-
eration to the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping
and restore effective competition).
174. See Hoekman & Mavrodis, supra note 39, at 46 (explaining that the impact
of public interest clauses is diminished by the fact that they are invoked at the final
stage of antidumping investigations, by which time users have a heavier burden in
countering firmly established evidence).
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institutional decision-making process discussed above.''
The Commission, therefore, conducts a second-phase analysis to
consider whether imposing antidumping duties would cause more
damage to other Community industries and interest groups than pro-
vide more benefits to the complaining Community industry. In order
to appraise effectively the economic and commercial interests in-
volved, the purported benefits of imposing duties for the Community
industry must be assessed carefully against the effects that such du-
ties will have on all other interested parties. As a general principle,
the Commission considers four sets of interested parties: (1) Com-
munity traders and importers; (2) upstream suppliers; (3) industrial
users; and (4) general consumers. In some cases, special considera-
tion is also given to external economic policy issues.
The impact of the measures on all of these groups of economic op-
erators is examined cumulatively and weighed against the benefits
accruing to the complaining Community industry. This is not a pre-
cise scientific process because it would be practically impossible to
carry out a strict cost-benefit analysis in each case.'76 Nevertheless,
there are instances where the weight of some interests discourages
imposing duties because that would not be in the general Community
interest.
1. Assessment of the Effect of Measures on Community Traders and
Importers
Imposing antidumping measures will have an adverse effect on
traders and importers of the dumped product. In earlier cases, the
Commission simply considered that the adverse effects were coun-
terbalanced by the positive benefits of low dumped import prices
previously enjoyed by the traders and importers. Balancing one
against the other, there was no harm caused to the Community as a
whole. 1
7
175. See supra Part II (discussing the conflicts surrounding the Community in-
terest test that led to the amendments to the Basic Regulation).
176. See Bronckers, Cost-Benefit Analyses, supra note 35, at 23-24 (arguing
that, although some costs could be politically admissible for a government, merely
finding that a particular antidumping measure imposes costs or that the producer's
benefit is less than the consumer's cost, is not necessarily dispositive).
177. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1645/95, supra note 29, at 5, 20. The
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The Commission, now, conducts a more thorough analysis. The
current assessment considers three main criteria: (a) the importance
of traders and importers in the sales and distribution process of the
relevant product; (b) their ability to absorb duties in profit; and (c)
the effect of measures on their future viability.
(a) The inportance of traders/importers in the sales and distribu-
tion process
First, the Commission places in context the economic significance
of the group. The factors that increase such significance include the
group's importance as facilitators of imports, its role as employers,
and its contribution to the overall functioning of the market.'" Con-
versely, the nominal number of importers and their limited economic
strength marginalizes their importance in relation to the complaining
Community industry.'
7
Next, the Commission measures the economic viability of the
Commission stated in this ruling that:
provisional measures might affect the market shares and businesses of those
importers who have, to a large extent, benefited from the unfairly low
dumped import prices, but such an effect would not harm the Community in-
terest as a whole, because antidumping measures should normally have a
positive effect on those distributors which have suffered from the unfair com-
petition.
Id.
178. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1732/97 of 4 September 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Stainless Steel Fasteners Onginating
in the People's Republic of China, India and Malaysia, 1997 O.J. (L 243) 17, 33
(stating that the distribution of the dumped product was characterized by a signifi-
cant number of importers and traders that operated between the producers and the
users of the product in such a way that the behavior of the importers and traders on
the market significantly influenced the price of the dumped product). Furthermore,
it was found that the Community industry had minimal direct contact with the user
industries and therefore relied on the distribution network for most of its sales. See
id. The Commission finally concluded that, although the trader and importer's
positive situation was likely to continue if measures were not imposed, their situa-
tion would not significantly worsen if measures were imposed. See nL at 34.
179. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1092 97 of 16 June 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Advertising Mlatches Onginating in
Japan, 1997 O.J. (L 158) 8, 18 (observing that the Commission considered that re-
fraining from imposing antidumping measures would entail an advantage for a
very limited number of importers while disadvantaging the Community industry
overall). Additionally, if the Commission did not impose measures, there would
likely be negative economic effects (e.g., plant closures). See id.
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group in terms of its market power, its ability to set prices, and its
dependency on the Community industry. Adverse effects are consid-
ered minimal if traders and importers have a large selection of sup-
pliers from which to source products. '" This is particularly true
where traders and importers buy products from both Community and
foreign suppliers.'
(b) The ability of traders/importers to absorb duties in their profits
The higher the gross profit on the allegedly dumped products, the
more likely that importers and traders will be able to absorb anti-
dumping duties. Consequently, the adverse effects of imposing
measures on these groups are less likely to outweigh injury to the
Community industry. Substantial mark-ups between importation and
resale are a strong indicator that traders, importers, and retailers can
absorb the additional duties in their profit margins.' Additionally, in
assessing this factor, the Commission also considers a retailer's abil-
ity to pass on the costs of additional duties.' 8 Notably, the Commis-
sion has ruled that importers should be able to absorb the costs of
duties in their profits.'84 Often average gross margins are exaggerated
and the market's ability to absorb increased prices from the imposi-
180. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 18/98 of 7 January 1998 Imposing a Pro-
visional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Synthetic Fiber Rope Originating in In-
dia, 1998 O.J. (L 4) 28, 36 (stating that "since importers and distributors have the
power to set the prices on the market and are generally free to determine the source
of their supply (Community or imported), the Commission does not see that they
would be adversely affected by the imposition of measures.").
181. See id. at 34 (delineating the Community and foreign traders involved in
the case).
182. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 165/97, supra note 157, at 13, 15 (ex-
plaining that antidumping duties would be absorbed eventually somewhere be-
tween the importer and the final consumer-and that after a common 100 percent
margin was added before retail sale, it would most likely be bome entirely by the
consumer). The Commission noted that although numerous large retailers con-
tended that they had reduced their margins to respond to consumer expectations,
the retailers had provided no evidence to support this claim. See id.
183. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 967/00, supra note 116, at 4, 10 (stating
that "any price increase due to antidumping measures is likely to be moderate and
thus carried over to the customers of the importers and traders").
184. See Commission Regulation 1732/97, supra note 178, at 17, 35 (stating that
importers and retailers should not obtain advantages through dumping since this
creates an imbalance vis a vis the other competitors, namely the Community in-
dustry).
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tion of duties is underestimated. The Community institutions often
make broad generalizations, which have little support in commercial
reality." '
(c) The effect on the econonic viability of'traders, importers
General injury indicators are then applied to the group."' Any in-
jury is assessed in terms of loss of revenues, employment, and other
criteria. 87 This analysis is less thorough than the injury analysis car-
ried out on damages done to the complaining Community industry
and is based on far less extensive economic data. " Nevertheless, the
current analysis is more exhaustive than that carried out prior to the
change in methodology. Despite this, there is little proof that the im-
pact of imposing duties on importers and traders would, in the ab-
sence of exceptional circumstances, be deemed sufficient by the
Community institutions to outweigh the impact on the Community
industry itself. Even where substantiated claims have been made that
the Community's internal distribution system had more economic
significance than the complaining Community industry itself, these
interests have been rejected in favor of protecting the Community in-
dustry. In Textile Footvear from the PRC, ' for example, both em-
ployment and turnover for companies involved after distribution
185. See Council Regulation 2155/97. supra note 170, at 12.
186. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2140/97, supra note 125, at 61, 71-73
(considering the factors and injurious impact of the dumped imports with regard to
the Community industry).
187. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 467/98 of 23 February 1998 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Potassium Permangenate Originating
in India and the Ukraine, 1998 O.J. (L 60) 1 (analyzing the specific economic im-
pact of the proposed antidumping measures on various distribution channels).
188. See P. Tharakan et al., Interface Between .ntidnping Poli: and Conpe-
tition Policy, 21 WORLD ECON. 1035, 1041 (1998).
189. See Council Regulation 2155/97, supra note 170, at 1, 14. The Council
stated that:
despite the greater significance of the whole distribution chain of textile foot-
wear in the Community in terms of both turnover and employment, the direct
effects of possible antidumping measures on the financial situation of these
companies would be negligible if the amount of antidumping duty were to be
fully passed on the consumer, furthermore indirect financial effects could
only be expected if, due to this price increase, consumers \%ere to significantly
reduce their purchases of the product concerned.
Id.
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were higher than the Community manufacturing industry."" Never-
theless, the interests of the Community industry prevailed and anti-
dumping duties were imposed.' 9'
2. Effect of Measures on Upstream Suppliers
In normal circumstances, refraining from imposing duties will ad-
versely affect upstream suppliers (i.e., suppliers of raw materials,
components, etc.) since their economic well-being depends, in part,
on the prosperity of the relevant Community industry. '92 The Com-
mission has gone so far as to link the need to protect the suppliers for
Community industries with the need to protect the Community in-
dustry itself."" The impact of antidumping measures is only limited
in two circumstances: first, where the volume or value of the materi-
190. Id.
191. See Council Regulation 393/98 of 16 February 1998 Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Stainless Steel Fasteners Originating in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, India, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, 1998 O.J. (L
50) 1, 11 (arguing that since a greater number of people were employed by import-
ers and traders of the dumped product, it would be in the Community's best inter-
est not to impose duties as higher prices because the imposition of duties decrease
demand and cause employment cuts). The Commission, however, reasoned that
since importers and traders have optional sources of supply, the effect of measures
could be minimized by reducing profit margins and slightly increasing prices to
customers. See id. Moreover, given the continued need for imported products and
the fact that all products are sold to users through a well-established network of
traders, the Commission considered that employment would not be adversely af-
fected if measures were imposed. See id.
192. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1023/97 of 6 June 1997 Imposing a Pro-
visional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Flat Wooden Pallets Originating in Po-
land, 1997 O.J. (L 150) 4, 12 (noting that the upstream raw material supplier to the
Community pallet industry was highly dependent upon its sales to the Community
industry and that downsizing the Community pallet industry would have direct ef-
fects on the profitability and employment of the upstream industry). Thus, if anti-
dumping duties were not imposed, the dumped imports from Poland would de-
crease the Community pallet industry's market share in wooden pallets and, in
turn, negatively effect the Community wooden pallet industry's upstream suppli-
ers. See id.
193. See Commission Regulation 2211/96 of 20 November 1996 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Unbleached Cotton Fabrics Origi-
nating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and
Turkey, 1996 O.J. (L 295) 3, 15 (stating that it would be in the interest of Commu-
nity upstream industries to safeguard the Community cotton fabrics industry be-
cause it is an indispensable part of the European textile sector).
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als provided by upstream industries is relatively low, and second,
where Community producers source the bulk of their raw materials
from outside the Community."'
3. Effect of Measures on User Groups
The commercial and economic effect of antidumping measures on
industrial user groups is one of the strongest factors weighing against
the imposition of duties. User groups will absorb the price increases
caused by imposing additional duties, which will increase the re-
spective cost of production.! ' The Commission needs to pay sub-
stantial attention to the commercial and economic effects as the user
groups mount most of the lobbying efforts against the adoption of
antidumping measures.' 6 Conversely, when these groups do not
lobby or protest against the imposition of duties, the Commission as-
sumes that antidumping measures will have a limited effect upon the
user groups. 97 If the Commission chooses to ignore the effects of an-
tidumping measures on user groups though, it will expose itself to
criticism from the Member States in which the groups are preva-
lent.198
The Commission again appears to examine three main factors in
measuring the effect of antidumping measures on user industries: (a)
the competitive conditions in these markets, (b) the input costs, and
(c) the range of possible responses open to suppliers.
194. See supra notes 170, 192 and accompanying text (describing cases in which
the Commission restrained antidumping measures on account of the limited value
of materials from upstream industries and external sourcing capacity).
195. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1732 97, supra note 178, at 17, 23
(claiming that the Commission believes that consumers will bear the increase in
relevant product prices caused by imposing measures, although the extent will de-
pend on the industry's pricing strategy as well as the importers and distributors).
196. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (illustrating the lobbying ef-
forts of user groups to deter antidumping measures in Soda .shfron the L'SA).
197. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 720/2000 of 27 April 2000 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Color-television Picture Tubes origi-
nating in India, Malaysia, the PRC, and Korea. 2000 O.J. (L 102) 15 (concluding
that since user industries lacked interest in participating in the antidumping inves-
tigation, antidumping measures taken against the concerned countries would not
significantly deteriorate their situation).
198. See Con-, supra note 12, at 83 (explaining that an expanding membership of
the EU has resulted in diverging interests among constituent Members).
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(a) The effects on the competitive conditions in these markets.
From the supply side, the imposition of antidumping duties will
have an anti-competitive impact inside the Community market. "" In
turn, this will affect the competition between user industries and their
suppliers. The question is whether this anticompetitive effect will be
sufficiently disproportionate to the benefits to the Community sup-
pliers from the imposition of antidumping duties.
The Community institutions have developed a repertoire of ex-
cuses for dismissing the adverse economic, commercial, and finan-
cial consequences of imposing antidumping duties. One claim is that
imposing measures will restore competition to a natural level since,
previously, users benefited from an artificially suppressed market"x'
Users' concerns that the imposition of duties will result in a shortage
of future supplies are dismissed on the basis that alternative sources
of supply will remain available. These sources include: (a) existing
Community suppliers accessing a production capacity that has been
unused because of inadequate financial return;2"' (b) domestic suppli-
ers that will emerge once market conditions have returned to 'nor-
mality'; °2 and (c) suppliers in other countries not accused of dump-
203ing.
199. See STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 31, at 153 (explaining that, al-
though some argue that imposing duties reduces competition in the supply market,
Community authorities maintain that higher prices actually increase competition).
The authors further note that Community authorities have focused greater attention
in recent cases on available alternative sources of supply and access to competitive
suppliers. See id.
200. See id. at 153 (noting how the Commission dismissed the idea that anti-
dumping measures could result in a monopolistic market, instead holding that
measures were pro-competitive because they actually maintained the same number
of suppliers).
201. See, e.g., Council Regulation 368/98 of 16 February 1998 Imposing a De-
finitive Antidumping Duty on Imports of Glyphosates Originating in the People's
Republic of China, 1998 O.J. (L 47) 1, 6 (asserting that antidumping measures
would maintain, or even increase, the number of competitors in the Community
market).
202. See id. at 6.
203. See Commission Regulation 1465/96, supra note 128, at 47 (arguing that
the imposition of antidumping measures would lead to the development of a du-
opolist supply market, which may in turn have adverse effects on price). The
Commission refuted the argument, reasoning that the imposition of antidumping
measures on the country that was dumping would not prevent exporters in third
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In many cases, these assumptions are far from the economic real-
ity. Duopolies have been reinforced, tight supply conditions exacer-
bated, and frequently there is little evidence of the emergence of new
market entrants. In the same vein, often supplies from countries not
covered by the investigation cannot be relied upon due to the predi-
lection that many Community industries will present consecutive
complaints against producers in different countries, allowing them to
isolate progressively the Community market from external competi-
tion.204 The dismissal of these important concerns is not a construc-
tive policy to follow if proper and effective reform of the Commu-
nity interest test is to be implemented. The Community institutions
should realize that such superficial examinations of the economic
market will undoubtedly draw unwanted political attention.
(b) The impact of imposing measures on input costs
The Commission's continued approach of calculating the cost of
imposing duties on the basis of the cost of the component part as a
percentage of a finished product and determining the cost of in-
creased duties on that basis is unfortunate. In Ringbinder Mecha-
nism,2 5 for example, the cost of the ringbinder mechanism as part of
a finished binder was established as 10.8 percent of the finished
product. The average antidumping duty imposed was twelve percent.
Therefore, the additional cost borne by the manufacturers of the fin-
ished product was 1.3 percent. The adoption of this approach makes
it highly unlikely that measures would ever be refused, because even
if the cost element of a component was as high as twenty-five per-
cent, and the duties proposed were fifty percent, the additional
countries from entering the Community market. See idL
204. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2861,93 of 18 October 1993 Imposing a De-
finitive Antidumping Duty on Imports of Certain Magnetic Disks (3.5" micro-
disks) originating in Japan, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China, 1993 O.J.
(L 262) 4; Council Regulation 2199/94 of 14 October 1994 Imposing a Definitive
Antidumping Duty on Imports of Certain Magnetic Disks (3.5" microdisks) origi-
nating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, 1994 O.J. (L 236) 2; Council
Regulation 663/96 of 2 June 1996 Imposing a Definitive Antidumping Duty on
Imports of Certain Magnetic Disks (3.5" micodisks) Originating in Malaysia,
Mexico and the United States, 1996 O.J. (L 92) 1: Commission Regulation 431/96
of 17 April 1996 Imposing a Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of 3.5"
microdisks originating in Indonesia, 1996 O.J. (L 63) 4.
205. Commission Regulation 1465/96. supra note 128.
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charge would only be 12.5 percent.' °6
This approach is unrealistic for three reasons. First, it ignores the
inflationary effects of imposing duties on the market. Once anti-
dumping duties are in place, Community prices for the product under
investigation tend to rise, especially if a high duty has been imposed.
The proportion of the cost of protection attributable to the component
will therefore rise commensurably, as will the overall input cost after
duties have been imposed.
Second, cutting alternative sources of supply from non-
Community producers can lead to problems in supply reliability.
This problem is particularly acute when the product is not a com-
modity or when only a few countries supply the product. Imposing
antidumping duties can effectively cut off these supplies, leaving in-
dustrial users with an unhealthy dependency on the Community in-
dustry. °7 This predicament is often further exacerbated when the
complainants turn their attention to other countries and lodge anti-
dumping complaints against them. °0
Third, many Community industries operate in an internationally
competitive environment where it is important to control and, if pos-
sible, cut product costs. Plants and production facilities are built ac-
cording to certain specifications and budgeted costs in order to
maintain competitive positions. An unforeseen increase in costs of
production as small as one percent can lead industrial producers to
cut down on costs elsewhere. Frequently, this means cuts in the level
of the workforce or the level of proposed investment, suggesting that
the knock-on effect of imposing measures can be significant.2°
Thus, additional input costs cannot be quantified adequately by a
simple calculation based on an estimate of the input cost multiplied
by the proposed level of duty. To determine this factor on such a ba-
sis is a gross over-simplification of a complex issue. Minimizing the
206. See generally STAN3ROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 31, at 147.
207. See Commission Regulation 823/95, supra note 32, at 15-16 (noting that
after definitive measures were imposed on imports of soda ash from the USA in
October 1995, exports of this product in the subsequent year fell to one-tenth of
their level during the investigation period).
208. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
209. See STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 206, at 148.
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costs to user groups in this way will very rarely, if ever, counterbal-
ance those of the complaining Community industry. Instead, the
Community institutions expose themselves to criticism by employing
an obviously defective and oversimplistic approach. This is unfortu-
nate because failing to weigh the additional costs of imposing meas-
ures on industrial users properly is one of the most sensitive and
controversial aspects of the Community interest evaluation process.
(c) The ranges ofpossible responses open to user groups.
Faced with the prospects of the imposition of duties, user groups
have a series of options available for dealing with the additional
costs, which the Commission also considers. In particular, the Com-
mission has considered four commercial responses to the imposition
of antidumping duties that appear to mitigate the harshness of im-
posing duties from the point of view of industrial user groups.
First, there is the possibility that the user industry can pass the ad-
ditional costs of the duties to the ultimate consumer. If this were
relatively simple, parties would tend to assume that it would be in the
overall interest of the Community to impose the duties.'" However, it
can be commercially difficult to pass on these costs to the ultimate
consumer. Where market conditions are tight, price increases may be
unacceptable in the market place." In any event, a market's response
to price increases is usually declining demand, which, in turn, leads
to lower turnover and profits.
Second, there is the likelihood that industrial users can absorb
these costs into their profit margins. Obviously, where margins are
relatively high, the overall costs of absorption would not outweigh
the benefits to the Community industry of imposing duties. Again,
however, there is an assumption made on the part of the Community
institutions that absorption of the cost of duties can still lead to prof-
itability. This assumption is often made without express knowledge
of the level of profits being made in the user industry.":
210. See id. at 147 (acknowledging that the Community authorities consider the
ability of the user industry to remain unharmed by passing the antidumping duties
on to the end consumer).
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2320/97 of 17 November 1997 Imposing De-
finitive Antidumping Duties on Imports of Certain Seamless Pipes and Tubes of
Iron or Non-Alloy Steel Originating in Hungary. Poland, Russia, the Czech Re-
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Third, the industry can downsize the workforce. In balancing job
losses in the complaining industry against those in downstream in-
dustries, the Commission has taken a skeptical view of representa-
tions that the employment consequences for downstream industries
would be greater than for the complaining industry.2 '" The Commis-
sion tends to assume that job losses in the downstream sector will be
more than compensated by job savings in the complaining indus-
tries.1 4 Neither of these assumptions can be made without careful
contemplation and analysis.
Finally, the Commission also considers the relative ease with
which the user industry can seek alternative sources of supply from
countries not subject to dumping.2 ' Where sources of supply can be
easily switched, there is a strong likelihood that the imposition of
duties will not be refused on grounds of Community interest. Gener-
ally, the availability of this course of action would almost always de-
fuse the impact of any duties on an industrial user group."'
(d) Carrying out the assessment of the impact on industrial users
As a general proposition, the Commission has continued its policy
of subjugating the commercial interests of user groups in favor of
those of the complaining Community industry.17 In the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases, it has ignored representations made by such
groups and dismissed the argument that downstream user groups will
public, Romania, and the Slovak Republic, 1997 O.J. (L 322) 1.
213. See Commission Regulation 165/97, supra note 157, at 3, 14 (emphasizing
the lack of concrete evidence showing that antidumping measures would lead to
job losses for users but that, if such a loss existed, the Community would be com-
pensated by the preservation of jobs in the manufacturing sector and in upstream
industries).
214. See id. (emphasizing the extreme consideration used by the Commission to
consider all involved parties).
215. See Council Regulation 495/98, supra note 202, at 15 (emphasizing that
antidumping measures remove unfair obstacles to free trade, thus allowing other
producers to compete at a fair level).
216. See id. (explaining that, generally, effects on users caused by antidumping
measures would be negligible).
217. See Commission Regulation 2352/95 of 6 October 1995 Imposing a Provi-
sional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Coumarin Originating in the People's Re-
public of China, 1995 O.J. (L 239) 4, 11-12 (stating that there would only be a
minimal effect from the increased price of coumarin due to antidumping duties on
the production cost of most fragrance compounds).
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be penalized by the imposition of duties on the basis that these users
have benefited from the price advantages that dumped products bring
and that there is no justification for allowing unfairly low prices to
persist.
211
This refusal amounts to the most significant limitation on the new
approach taken by the Commission towards the reform of the Com-
munity interest test. It completely undermines the policy objective
that these reforms were presumably intended to achieve. Ultimately,
it confirms that the overriding need to protect complaining Commu-
nity industries is sacrosanct in the Community's antidumping policy.
4. hnpact of Measures on Consumers
Consumer organizations play an increasingly active part in anti-
dumping proceedings."' The arguments of the final consumer, how-
ever, have never carried much weight with the Community institu-
tions, despite the fact that they ultimately pay the full cost of the
measures imposed.
There has been no significant change in the Commission's ap-
proach. Little weight is attached to the concerns of the general con-
sumer, even when consumer organizations submit formal representa-
tions to the Commission. This is because the impact of the additional
costs caused by the antidumping duties is invariably considered mi-
nor or insignificant.20 The Community authorities assume that the
maintenance of a viable Community industry is in the consumer's
best interest.'
218. See Council Regulation 2208/96, supra note 74, at 16 (emphasizing that
without corrective measures to address dumping. the Community industry would
suffer greatly).
219. See supra notes 4044 and accompanying text (detailing the attempts by
consumer unions to improve its status in antidumping proceedings).
220. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1069,97 of 12 June 1997 Imposing a
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen Originating
in Egypt, India and Pakistan, 1997 O.J. (L 156) 11, 28 (explaining that an anti-
dumping duty of ten percent would pass an ultimate price increase of three percent
to the consumer if the duty was passed fully through the supply chain to the ulti-
mate consumer). The Commission considered this impact of the proposed meas-
ures to be minor, especially as high competition would ensure lower consumer
prices. See id.
221. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2380,95 of 2 October 1995 Imposing a
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In some cases, however, the price increases that consumers must
bear as a result of antidumping measures are substantial. For exam-
ple, in Personal Fax Machines from the PRC,222 the Commission it-
self accepted that the duties imposed would result in price increases
to the consumer of more than twenty percent. Nevertheless, the
Commission observed that the long-term advantages to the con-
sumer, resulting from the development of alternative supply sources
from the Community producers, would outweigh the price in-
223creases.
The reception of earlier views of the Commission attracted much
controversy. 24 Combined with its approach to dealing with the inter-
ests of user groups (i.e., passing additional cost of duties to the con-
sumer), the blanket approach-that consumers must always be will-
ing to bear the costs of protecting complaining Community
industries-indicates that the new methodology towards the Com-
munity interest test is not sufficiently radical.
A notable exception to this general approach is the termination of
antidumping investigations in Disc-changers from Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand.2 1 In this case, the Commission ex-
amined the likely costs and benefits that the imposition of measures
Provisional Antidumping Duty on Imports of Plain Paper Photocopiers Originating
in Japan, 1995 O.J. (L 244) 1, 28 (stating that it is in the long-term interest of con-
sumers to maintain a variety of sources of supply and competition).
222. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2140/97, supra note 125, at 61, 76 (bas-
ing the twenty percent price increase on a static scenario in which the common
gross margins for traders and retailers established during the investigation).
223. See id. (stating that, while resulting price increases will be unavoidable, the
long-term advantages to the consumer should be considered). The Commission
suggested that the development of alternate supply sources would lead to a com-
plete range of products and, ultimately, more sophisticated product types. See id.
224. See STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 31, at 150 (suggesting that Com-
munity Authorities assume that maintaining a competitive industry is within the
best interests of the consumer).
225. See Commission Decision 1999/55 of 21 December 1999 Terminating the
Antidumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of Certain Laser Optical Reading
Systems, and the Main Constituent Elements Thereof, for use in Motor Vehicles,
Originating in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, and Tai-
wan, 1999 O.J. (L 18) 62 (opting against the adoption of antidumping measures
against imports of disc changers from concerned countries).
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would have on the economic operators concerned.::" The Commis-
sion held that the imposition of duties would limit consumer choice,
thereby encouraging many exporters, particularly those with high
duties, to withdraw from the Community market.!" The Community
industry could not compensate this loss of choice in the foreseeable
fiture.'- The Commission, though, also took several other factors
into account. -9 First, while the market share of the Community in-
dustry was zero percent in 1996, it had reached 1.4 percent by the in-
vestigation period.21' Second, about eighty-one percent of the disc-
changers sold in the Community originated in the countries under in-
vestigation.21 Third, the level of employment in the relevant Com-
munity industry was low.2'2 Ultimately, the Commission considered
that the imposition of antidumping measures would disproportion-
ately affect importers, traders, and consumers of the product con-
cerned. 33
Although this decision represents a positive application of cost-
benefit analysis by the Commission, it also suggests that consumer
interests will never be given the same weight as the Community in-
dustry, and only in the exceptional case might consumer interests
play a bigger role.
226. See id. at 64 (acknowledging the existence of injurious dumping, but for-
going the opportunity to detail such findings).
227. See id. at 65 (explaining that the product had a large growth potential that
should be free of the imposition of duties).
228. See id. (demonstrating a concern for the potential effect consumers would
experience if deprived of the advantages of technological variety and develop-
ment).
229. Id. at 64-65.
230. See id. at 64 (suggesting that, assuming an average duty of twenty percent
on the imports value of the product concerned, duties imposed on product imports
would account for between six and ten times the total value of production of the
Community industry).
231. See Commission Decision 1999/55, supra note 225, at 64 (explaining why
potential expansion of production in accordance with Community industry plans
would only be a fraction of duties imposed).
232. See id. (explaining that resulting Community industry gains would be
minimal due to the low employment level).
233. See id. (acknowledging that the interests of consumers are of higher im-
portance than the interests of the Community industry).
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5. Considerations of External Economic Policy
In some cases, the interests of maintaining good trade relations
have been raised.14 The argument over this aspect of Community in-
terest is usually dismissed based on the underlying assumption that
international commerce between two countries will be conducted in
accordance with the principles of fair trade.2" Nevertheless, the
Community institutions examine the issue and look at the size of the
trade affected in proportion to the total trade, as well as other similar
factors. The Community institutions have thus far concluded that the
measures will not materially affect the trade relationship between the
Community and the country concerned.
Article 15 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement requires the
Community to consider the individual economic situations of devel-
oping countries when implementing antidumping policies.'" The
Community must explore the possibilities of constructive remedies
before applying antidumping measures when the measures would af-
fect the key interests of developing country members.1 7 The Com-
munity authorities interpret this to mean that while a country's state
of development can be taken into account when examining what type
of measures are most appropriate, it is not used to consider whether it
is appropriate to take protective measures. 2'8 It is difficult to under-
234. See, e.g., Council Regulation 137/96, supra note 124, at 4 (stating that,
while the Community aims to increase economic links with the PRC, it expects
that Chinese producers and exporters comply with fair trade principles).
235. See id. (stating that the Commission considers it to be unrealistic to assume
that antidumping measures imposed to restore fair trade in this market sector will
have a significant impact on the trade relationship between the Community indus-
try and the People's Republic of China).
236. WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. XV.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 93/521 of 3 September 1993 Accepting
Undertakings Given in Connection with the Antidumping Review in Respect of
Imports of Binder and Baler Twine Originating in Brazil, 1993 O.J. (L 251) 28, 31
(stating that Brazilian producers argued that it was not in the interest of the Com-
munity to take action because the region in Brazil where the concerned industry is
situated is highly dependent on the production of the relevant product and, there-
fore, should be given preferential treatment). The Commission rejected the Brazil-
ian producers' argument, however, considering that the situation should be exam-
ined in light of Article 15 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, which provides
that special regard must be given by developed countries to the special situation of
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stand why the Commission adopted this narrow interpretation as it
would clearly be a factor that they could consider under the general
heading of "Community interests."
The Community institutions are sensitive to any accusations that
they are applying discriminatory treatment to the exports of one
country as against another.24' As a consequence, when considering
the interests of the Community, the fact that antidumping measures
have been taken against other countries regarding the same product
will militate in favor of taking measures against further countries.
D. OVERALL EVALUATION PROCESS
The decision to impose antidumping duties is taken after balanc-
ing: (a) the positive and negative effects of imposing measures on the
complaining Community industry itself; and (b) the benefits of im-
posing measures to the complaining Community industry against the
negative effects on other industrial groups and interested parties. If
the imposition of duties is to be avoided, it must be shown that the
likely negative impact of such measures would be clearly dispropor-
tionate to the likely benefits of such measures in either of the above
scenarios.
Unfortunately, in carrying out this appraisal, it can be strongly ar-
gued that the Community institutions give undue credit, on the com-
plainant's side, to the need to eliminate the trade-distorting effects of
dumping and the need to restore effective competition to the indus-
try. An almost irrefutable presumption is applied in imposing duties,
i.e., that it is in the best interests of the Community. In the absence of
such a presumption, more cases would be terminated, for the balance
of interests would be tipped to the side of interested parties other
developing countries when considering the application of antidumping measures.
See id. The Commission concluded that the stage of development of exporting
countries should be taken into account when examining what measures are most
appropriate in a particular case, but should not be determinative of the appropriate-
ness of taking protective measures. See id. at 33.
239. See Kofi 0. Kufour, The Developing ('ountries and the Shaping of
GA7T/WTO Antidumping Law, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 167, 179, 184 (1998) (noting
that, during the Uruguay Round negotiations, countries like Korea and Singapore,
who are principal targets of antidumping investigations, proposed a public interest
clause for the new GATT Antidumping Code).
240. See WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1.
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than the complaining Community industry.24' The Community insti-
tutions, however, have not been able to rid themselves of this bias.
Even in cases where the pool of all other interests combined is ex-
tremely significant, the need to give protection to the Community in-
dustry remains paramount.24' The current status results from the
Community institutions' tendency to give undue weight to the com-
plaining Community industry's claims, while dismissing genuine and
substantial concerns from other affected groups, as well as belittling
the need to respect the other side of the equation.
CONCLUSION
While it is still relatively early to pronounce on the final success or
failure of these reforms to the application of the Community interest,
preliminary indications suggest that radical reform is necessary.
While the Community institutions seem to be going through the mo-
tions of conducting a more extensive and exhaustive appraisal of the
overall interests of the Community when conducting antidumping
investigations, the final results show little difference from the earlier
approach that had attracted so much criticism.
Empirically, there is little evidence of a significant policy change
on the part of the Community institutions when balancing Commu-
nity interests.14' From this perspective, the process seems to embody
more style than substance. In the overwhelming majority of cases,
the interests of all other interest groups are consistently outweighed
when measured against those of the complaining Community indus-
try. This is certainly not the outcome one would have anticipated af-
ter a complete restructuring of the procedural, substantive, and even
241. See VERMULST & DRIESSEN, supra note 82, at 157 (suggesting that the
Community interest determination will be only of marginal significance).
242. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 209/97, supra note 122, at 22 (empha-
sizing that, if left unregulated, injurious dumping activities would hinder the in-
dustry, and potentially encourage such industries to relocate outside the Commu-
nity).
243. From 1997 to July 2000, only one antidumping investigation was termi-
nated because the imposition of duties would not have been in the Community in-
terest. See Commission Decision 1999/55, supra note 225, at 65 (noting that the
imposition of measures would disproportionately affect traders, importers, and
consumers).
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methodological approach to making these assessments.
The refusal or unwillingness to take into account adequately the
interests of other relevant economic operators, even when these are
extremely significant, is the major identifiable shortcoming of this
restructuring. In addition, there are other deficiencies. First, Article
21(1), which embodies the Community interest clause itself, allows
for Community authorities to make a cost-benefit analysis before
imposing antidumping measures. The provision, however, does not
mandate how the Commission is to analyze the overall effects of an-
tidumping duties on the Community. When no effective representa-
tions are made on behalf of user groups or other interested parties,
the Commission may choose which factors it wishes to include in its
assessment of the Community interest. This lack of empirical eco-
nomic analysis in the assessment of Community interest will invaria-
bly mean that claims and allegations made by the complaining
Community industry will appear more readily accepted than those of
other interested parties. Therefore, in assessing the impact of anti-
dumping measures on the economy as a whole, the Community
authorities should not only rely on the resources and arguments pro-
vided by the private parties to a case.
Second, the law is vague. Rather than contemplating a comprehen-
sive analysis and specifying the different factors and values that have
to be weighed against one another, the Community interest clause is
drafted more as a grant of discretion to the administering authorities.
It is in sharp contrast with the detail given by the provision setting
forth the analysis to be undertaken for determining the injury suf-
fered by the Community industry.:2 A provision requiring a manda-
tory cost-benefit analysis would provide more balance and fairness.
A cost-benefit analysis under the Community interest test could pro-
vide a helpful framework for determining and distinguishing accept-
able from unacceptable cost-levels. 4 : With a more comprehensive
picture, the Community interest test will become more meaningful
and over time more detailed criteria can be developed on how to bal-
ance the different components of the Community interest.
244. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 2. art. 3.
245. See Bronckers, Cost-Benefit AnalYses, supra note 35, at 26 (explaining that
a cost-benefit analysis should extend to encompass qualitative factors).
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Currently, the weight given to the interests of the complaining
Community industry is excessive. In part, this arises from having to
apply the two overriding considerations, i.e., that the trade-distorting
effects of dumping should be eradicated, and that effective compcti-
tion be restored. It is in the public interest for the Community to
make every effort to ensure that regulatory interventions are propor-
tionate, yet limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the in-
tended common-policy goal. It is also worth recalling that the pro-
portionality principle is an unwritten, general principle of
Community law.246
Third, the law is incomplete. Community interest is not considered
a relevant factor during reviews of existing antidumping measures.
There is no good reason for this omission. Once a measure is in
place, its effects on the economy (e.g., effects on users and consum-
ers) may be different than originally anticipated due to changed cir-
cumstances.
Finally, when proceeding from the adoption of provisional anti-
dumping measures to definitive measures, more often than not the
question of Community interest seems already resolved in the minds
of the Community institutions. It is rare indeed for a change of heart
to occur once provisional findings of Community interest have been
made.4 7 This indicates that the Community interest issue is de facto
closed as early as the provisional stage of the investigation.
The Commission, therefore, appears to have failed to take advan-
tage of the opportunity to address the criticisms that were leveled
against its earlier approach to the Community interest test. The
change of methodology will not defuse the tensions that continue to
exist among the Member States. In the absence of effective and sub-
stantial reform to this part of antidumping investigations, the sub-
stantive and institutional problems that have afflicted Community
antidumping policy can be expected to continue unabated.
246. See generally Case 66/82, Fromancais v. FORMA, 1983 E.C.R. 395 (1983)
(holding that provisions in question, which applied to a minor infringement, should
have been reserved for a more serious breach, and were therefore contrary to prin-
ciple of proportionality).
247. The only notable exception was Council Regulation 1567/97, supra note
167, at 31.
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